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A CYBERNETIC APPROACH TO FAMILY POWER STRUCTURE

by

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and

recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for

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POWER STRUCTURE

submitted by J. WALTER A. GOLTZ

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ABSTRACT

Recent studies of family power have failed to provide consistent, comparable findings, indicating a basic lack of conceptual and methodological clarity. Previous studies have almost exclusively used the static or structural model in the analysis of family power, placing the primary emphasis on measuring the outcome of family decisions.

The introduction of the normative, perceptual, and behavioral dimensions provides conceptual clarification in the analysis of family power on the structural level. It also provides a preliminary integration of the implications of such broad theoretical approaches to family study as the developmental, symbolic interaction, and exchange approaches. Congruence, or the lack of congruence, between the normative, perceptual, and behavioral dimensions is regarded as a characteristic of family power to be explained, rather than as a methodological shortcoming. The structural analysis of family power takes account not only of decision-making, but also of the division of labor, and the patterns of tension and conflict management.

A consistent demand for research which moves from the static analysis of the outcomes of family power to a dynamic view of the process of family power utilizing the insights of modern systems theory, has led to the development of a cybernetic morphogenic model of family interaction. This model integrates the findings and implications of the developmental, symbolic interaction, and exchange approaches with the insights provided by the systems approach. Two basic contributions of the model are its ability to differentiate positive, problematic,

and negative interaction styles, and the ability to isolate the dimension (perceptual, normative, or behavioral) within which a marital or familial problem originates. Both relations of harmony as well as relations of conflict can be handled by the model.

Methodological clarification on the structural level consists of the review of weaknesses noted by previous researchers, and the presentation of comprehensive suggestions for the improvement of family power measures, particularly those utilizing the self-report technique. The conceptualization of power in terms of the normative, perceptual, and behavioral dimensions emphasizes that the lack of congruence between dimensions of power may be an aspect of family reality rather than the result of methodological weaknesses.

Methodological clarification on the systems level consists of the review of available techniques, as well as the review of observational measures which are presently being developed. The application of a systems model to the study of family power is a new approach, resulting in the need for considerable flexibility in analysis and measurement.

The primary emphasis of this thesis is on providing theoretical clarification of both conceptual and methodological issues in the analysis and measurement of family power, taking account of both the structural and systems approaches. The ability of this orientation to provide a more complete understanding and explanation of the structure and dynamics of family power awaits its practical application.

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I. INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Power relations arouse a great deal of interest and attention because of their potential influence in a wide sphere of activities. Family power relations are no exception as evidenced by the growing amount of interest and research focused on this area during the past two decades (Safilios-Rothschild, 1970). The primary concern has been with family decision-making and conflict resolution processes.

This increased interest in the family power structure becomes all the more relevant in light of the changing relations between the sexes, which constitutes an increasingly problematical issue within our society. There appears to be a consistent movement from a patriarchal family power structure toward more egalitarian relations, particularly between husband and wife (Mogey, 1957; Dyer and Urban, 1958; Blood and Wolfe, 1960; Goode, 1963; Aldous, 1969; Rossi, 1970; Larson, 1972; Nye and Berardo, 1973). The traditional assumptions of patriarchal power are coming under increasing criticism, and there is accumulating evidence that the rate of change in the relations between the sexes has been steadily accelerating (Nimkoff, 1965; Vogel, 1965; Rossi, 1970; Hobart, 1972). An entire issue and part of the following issue of a well-known family journal (Journal of Marriage and the Family, Volume 33, Nos. 3 and 4) are devoted to an extended discussion of the changes taking place and being sought in the relations between the sexes. Nye and Berardo (1973:310) indicate that "the power of wives is increasing in areas formerly largely controlled by their husbands. It is probable ...that husbands typically are exercising more power in intrafamily

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areas formerly the domain of women."

An extended review of family power studies (Safilios-Rothschild, 1970) reveals both the variability and incomparability of the findings, which clearly indicates a basic lack of both conceptual and methodological clarity. The two-fold purpose of this thesis is to provide conceptual and methodological clarification of the issues involved in the analysis and measurement of family power.

On the conceptual level, family power has been analyzed almost exclusively in previous studies by the static or structural model, whose primary emphasis is on measuring the outcome of family power. This approach has lacked conceptual clarity, however, because concepts have been used in various ways by different researchers with little understanding of what dimension of family power a particular concept intends to measure. The analysis of family power on the structural level will be clarified through the introduction of the normative, perceptual, and behavioral dimensions of power; a technique which attempts to integrate the findings and implications of such broad theoretical approaches to family study as the developmental, symbolic interaction, and exchange approaches. Such clarification provides an important contribution to a better understanding of family power structure in that it overcomes the variability and incomparability of findings which arise from the use of poorly-defined concepts.

While conceptual clarification needs to take place in the analysis of the structure of family power as outlined above, a basic goal of this thesis is to move beyond the static analysis of the outcomes of family power (Turk and Bell, 1972) to an understanding of the process of family power. A number of researchers (Edwards, 1969; Sprey, 1969,

1971, 1972; Scanzoni, 1970, 1972; Turk and Bell, 1972; Olson and Rabunsky, 1972) have stressed the necessity of a more dynamic view of the process of family power, but very little concrete work has been done in the presentation of a model that can handle this kind of analysis. An understanding of the dynamic aspect of family interaction or negotiation requires the utilization of modern systems theory. The major contribution of this thesis is the introduction and application of the cybernetic approach to the study of family power. This systems model of power focuses attention on the process of family interaction rather than upon its outcome. A concerted attempt is made to integrate the findings and implications of the developmental, symbolic interaction, and exchange approaches to the family with the insights provided by the systems approach. This is not a sophisticated application of systems theory, but rather represents an initial attempt to apply the basic insight that the family is a system in which the behavior of each family member is dynamically related to that of every other family member.

On the methodological level, a number of refinements and revisions need to be made in order to extend and clarify our understanding of family power. These relate both to the structural model of power, as well as to the systems approach. The structural model of family power relies almost exclusively on the questionnaire method of obtaining data. Since this research proposes to bring conceptual clarification to the structural model through the introduction of the normative, perceptual, and behavioral dimensions, methodological refinement would then consist of the examination of methods which would utilize the insights provided by the introduction of the above dimensions. It is

expected that this reorganization and clarification would alleviate the problems experienced by Turk and Bell (1972) and by Olson and Rabunsky (1972) in their attempt to compare different measures of family power. At the present time, the systems model has not been applied to the study of family power. Methodological clarification would therefore consist of the review of those techniques which are available for measuring the process of family power, and the proposal of satisfactory techniques for the measurement of family power from the systems perspective.

The primary emphasis in both the conceptual and methodological areas is to provide theoretical clarification of the issues involved in studying family power. The collecting and analyzing of data will not be proposed in this thesis. The present focus is to provide an adequate theoretical base upon which later data collection and analysis can be built.

The second chapter will provide a critical review of the literature and a statement of crucial issues. Conceptual clarification will be provided in the third chapter, and the fourth chapter will be devoted to the methodological clarification of family power issues. Chapter five will then provide a summary of findings and conclusions reached.

II. CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

1. <u>Reviews of the family power concept</u>. An extensive amount of
research and investigation has been devoted to the area of family power
structure during the past two decades. It would be impossible to pro-
vide a complete review of the body of literature devoted to this area
in the brief scope of this thesis. It will therefore be necessary to
focus on major contributions as isolated in previous reviews, and to
pay particular attention to studies which have taken place since these
reviews were written.

There has been a great deal of disagreement regarding the con-
ceptualization of power but, according to Smith (1970:861), there has
been general agreement on two basic points of definition: (1) social
power is a person's potential for exerting a force toward change in
another person; (2) social power should not be regarded as simply a
quality, or qualities, possessed by the powerful person; but rather as
being determined by complex conditions governing the interdependence of
individuals in a social relationship.

Smith makes a basic criticism of social power studies. These
studies have tended to focus either on theory and to neglect the neces-
sary empirical support, or they have tended to focus on empirical
research and to neglect the necessary theoretical formulations. On the
one hand, the result is the development of complex models of social
power which are logically consistent and make strong appeals to reason,
but which are seldom substantiated by research findings. On the other
hand, an increasing number of empirical studies have been completed,

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but each study deals with a limited, and generally minute, aspect of social power theory, with the result that the findings are generally incomparable and/or contradictory.

A major review of family power studies concludes that "theories about power structure will not become more sophisticated and valid, until the methodology of power structure studies improves considerably to include the detailed study of all aspects of power and from the point of view of all contributing family members..." (Safilios-Rothschild, 1970:549). In contrast, Turk and Bell (1972) see the possibility of methodological clarification arising from conceptual clarification. They indicate that "a reanalysis of the concept of power is a requirement for the resolution of the [methodological] issues being posed." Olson and Rabunsky (1972:232), in their study of the validity of four measures of family power, conclude that both the conceptualization and operationalization of family power need to be improved. They state the hope that "before more research is done on substantive questions regarding family power that greater attention be given to dealing with the theoretical and methodological issues that continue to plague this intriguing but elusive concept." There is little doubt that both theoretical and methodological issues need further clarification in order to understand and explain the contradictory findings revealed by much of the literature.

The major review of studies concerned with the family power structure taking place during the decade of the sixties is provided by Constantina Safilios-Rothschild (1970). She asserts that the major studies published during this decade are those by Blood (1963, 1967) and Blood and Wolfe (1960); those by Kenkel (1961, 1963); and those by

Wilkening and associates (Wilkening and Morrison, 1963; Wilkening and Bharadwaj, 1966, 1967, 1968; Wilkening, 1968). In addition to these major studies she refers to the various studies which have attempted to assess the decision-making pattern in different types of American families, as well as the application of decision-making to various areas.

In his brief evaluation of family power studies, Broderick (1971:149) refers to the French and Raven (1960) conceptualization of interpersonal influence and to the Blood and Wolfe (1960) study of spousal power as the two most significant contributions to an understanding of the bases of power in informal interpersonal relationships. Both of these contributions need further elaboration in order to understand the development of the concept of family power.

2. Historical development of major concepts. There is little question that the one study which has been most often used as a basis for further research and which is most often quoted by family sociologists is Blood and Wolfe's Detroit study (Blood and Wolfe, 1960). This study sets forth what has come to be known as the resource theory of marital power. The theory asserts that in the marriage relationship the sources of power must be sought in the comparative resources which are brought to the marriage by the husband and wife. Resources are defined as anything which one partner makes available to the other to satisfy the latter's needs or attain his goals. The resources suggested are the husband's social status, income, occupation, and the couple's comparative education, comparative work participation, as well as organizational membership. They find that in modern society the patriarchal family has been largely replaced by the egalitarian family, with the result that "the balance of power...is determined by the comparative

resourcefulness of the two partners and by the life circumstances within which they live" (Blood and Wolfe, 1960:29).

Heer (1963) significantly revises the Blood and Wolfe conceptualization of resources by suggesting the importance of noneconomic resources in spousal transactions, in addition to the resources derived from the external situation. Such resources as the wife's personal attractiveness and her adequate performance in various roles also make an important contribution to the outcome of decisions. Heer proposes five possible bases of family power: (1) external social control; (2) the prior internalization of norms; (3) discrepancy between actual return and return expected under an alternative to the existing marriage or family; (4) relative competence; and (5) relative involvement. First, external social control refers to the normative or culturally sanctioned base of power. Blood and Wolfe (1960) examined various types of families in which a patriarchal tradition or normative structure might be expected to operate--farm families, immigrant families, Catholic families, families where the head and wife are aged, and families where the head and wife are uneducated--but found that the husband does not have substantially more power in any of these groups than in the average family. They interpreted these findings as evidence that normative definitions did not have an effect on power. Heer disagrees with their conclusion that external social control is thus weaker in industrial societies, and points out that external social control operates in terms of our liberal divorce laws and relatively equalitarian laws concerning the rights of husbands and wives in marriage. Secondly, internalization of norms takes place as the result of consistent external control. As the child learns and accepts what he can and can-

not do, these definitions are internalized through the process of socialization and thereafter need not be externally enforced. Thirdly, power is not based simply on the comparative resources of husband and wife but, according to Heer (1963:138), "the greater the difference between the value to the wife of the resources contributed by her husband and the value to the wife of the resources she might earn outside the existing marriage, the greater the power of her husband, and vice versa." It is assumed that both husband and wife conceive of the possibility of separation, divorce, and subsequent remarriage, and that this consideration of alternatives affects the power balance within the marriage. This revision of Blood and Wolfe's theory is based upon Homans (1961), and upon Waller's "principle of least interest." The partner with the least interest is the one for whom the discrepancy between actual return and potential return for contributed resources is the greatest. Fourthly, the partner with the most knowledge and the greatest relative competence in a particular area will tend to make the decisions in that area. Fifthly, competence is not considered alone, but must be seen in connection with relative involvement in a particular decision. Thus the wife may choose the color of the new automobile whereas the husband may choose the make of the car. The concepts of relative competence and relative involvement may help to explain why husbands and wives are more likely to make the final decisions in certain areas.

Rodman (1967) in a comparison of data on marital power between France, Greece, Yugoslavia and the United States found that the data from France and the United States supported the Blood and Wolfe "theory of resources." In Greece and Yugoslavia, in contrast, there is a nega-

tive correlation between the husband's educational status, his occupational status, his income and his authority score. Building upon the theory of resources, Rodman formulated the "theory of resources in cultural context" which states that the balance of marital power is influenced by the interaction of the comparative resources of husband and wife and the cultural or subcultural expectations about the distribution of marital power. Rodman (1967:322) points out that comparative resources are influential in the United States because of several underlying cultural factors: (1) the emphasis on an equalitarian ethic; (2) a high degree of flexibility about the distribution of marital power; and (3) the importance that education, occupation, and income have in defining a man's status. As a result of the normative ambiguity regarding marital authority a "power struggle" develops in which additional resources bring additional power. In Greece and Yugoslavia, in contrast, "the more education a man has, the likelier is he to grant his wife more authority, despite a traditional patriarchal culture" (1963:321). This is because groups at the higher educational and social levels are more likely to have learned "modern" norms regarding marital decision-making. Rodman concludes (1972:57) that education, income, and occupational status are not merely resource variables in a power struggle, but they are also positional variables in the social structure, and as such they may involve differing patterns of socialization with a greater or lesser likelihood of learning attitudes favorable toward the equalitarian distribution of power. Rodman's analysis demonstrates that resource theory needs to be seen in the context of prevailing cultural ideologies or the normative structure of power distribution. In analyzing family power it is necessary to assess the

influence of the normative content of roles in addition to the differ-
ential resources which each partner brings into the marriage, and in
addition to the resources within a marriage as compared to some other
alternative.

Burr (1973:188-198) examines Rodman's synthesis regarding family
power, and presents various hypotheses that may be theoretically de-
duced from Rodman's approach. These hypotheses spell out the contribu-
tions of various independent variables to power as a dependent vari-
able. The interrelationship of the various independent variables is
presented diagrammatically, and provides some revision and extension of
Rodman's major contribution.

It is apparent that the adherents of resource theory in its var-
ious forms are working within the broad perspective of the theory of
exchange. Whereas Blood and Wolfe emphasize the value of the compara-
tive resources which each person brings to the marital relationship,
Heer emphasizes the value of the resources available within the marital
relationship as compared to those resources available outside of the
marital relationship. Rodman recognizes the value of resources, but
adds the intervening variable of cultural ideology between resources
and marital power.

Resource theory has received the lion's share of attention in
terms of the amount of research which it has generated. A somewhat
different perspective of interpersonal influence which has not received
nearly as much attention is that provided by French and Raven (1960)
arising from the group dynamics tradition of research. Nevertheless it
has received some elaboration, and represents an important tradition of
research concerned with social power.

French and Raven propose five bases of power which O may exert over P: (1) reward power, which is based on the perception of P that O can mediate rewards for him; (2) coercive power, based on the expectation by P that he will be punished by O if he fails to conform; (3) legitimate power, which arises from internalized values in P which suggest that O has a legitimate right to influence P, and that P is obligated to accept this influence; (4) referent power, based on P's identification with O, or on the desire for such an identity or feeling of oneness; (5) expert power, based on the perception that O has some special knowledge or expertise.

The French and Raven model of power arising from small group research is applied to the marital relationship by Hallenbeck (1966). The five bases of power are examined in terms of their relevance for the marriage relationship, and some attempt is made to integrate the chief findings of resource theory. Hallenbeck's basic contribution is the contention that referent power in marriage stems from the desire of the spouses to be like their concepts of the "ideal" husband or wife. The husband does not hold referent power over his wife, but rather referent power arises from the role of ideal wife to which she aspires.

Secord and Backman (1964), integrating the ideas of French and Raven (1960), Thibaut and Kelley (1959), and Emerson (1962) suggest three interdependent determinants of social power: resources, dependencies, and alternatives. Resources are defined in terms of the bases of social power as outlined by French and Raven. The value of such resources, however, is determined by the dependency of the other person. Such dependencies may be due to some characteristic of the individual or the situation, or a combination of both, which makes the resources

of the other person especially valuable to him. The final determinant of power is a function of the availability of alternative sources of reward and alternative means of reducing costs. It is necessary then, in determining power in a relationship, not only to consider the resources of P and the dependency of O on P, but also the comparison of other possible alternatives.

A superficial analysis of the two major approaches indicates that they have a good deal in common. Both approaches, for example, emphasize the importance of resources in determining power. Resource theory tends to emphasize socio-economic resources whereas the group dynamics approach tends to emphasize psychological resources, but the concept of socio-economic resources is not absent as indicated by reference to reward and coercive power. Secondly, both resource theory and group dynamics theory in their revised forms emphasize the importance of cultural or normative constraints in determining power within the marital relationship. Thirdly, both approaches regard the consideration of alternatives to the present arrangement as an important factor in assessing the balance of power. Finally, there appears to be at least a tenuous relation between Heer's concept of relative involvement and Secord and Backman's consideration of dependencies in determining power.

From this brief analysis it is evident that an integration of the approach of resource theory and that of small group theory with reference to power relations is not out of the question. Further consideration will be given to such an integration at a later point in this thesis.

Having examined the historical development of the major concepts utilized in family power research, it now becomes possible to examine

some of the more recent approaches to family power research.

3. Recent contributions. A review of articles concerned with the family power issue appearing in six major publications (American Sociological Review, Family Process, Journal of Comparative Family Studies, Journal of Marriage and the Family, Sociometry, and the Family Coordinator), from 1970 through 1974, indicate that there is a continued interest with the question of family power.

(1) Methodological issues. Recent concern with family power has overwhelmingly focused on the methodological issues which have plagued the scientific study of this area. A number of studies (Turk and Bell, 1972; Olson and Rabunsky, 1972; Murphy and Mendelsohn, 1973; Turk, 1974) have been concerned with general methodological issues. Turk and Bell's study represents a comparison of nine major measures of power that have been used in the study of families and other groups. The replications demonstrate essentially the same results as those reported in the original studies, but the results vary substantially depending on which family member is used as the key informant and, more important, the measures are not very highly related to each other, indicating the necessity for a clearer specification of concepts. Olson and Rabunsky compare four measures of family power (predicted power, process power, retrospective power, and authority) with a criterion measure of outcome power, and they discover that none of the four measures prove valid. While not directly concerned with family power, the Murphy and Mendelsohn study is concerned with the relationship between observational and self-report data, and hence is relevant to issues raised in the study of family power. They find a positive relationship between the researchers' observations and the couples' self-reports relative to their communication, thus supporting the use of both self-

report and observational data in the study of family interaction. The strongest criticism of methodological procedures in family power studies comes from Turk (1973, 1974) who asserts that the major problem with most studies of family power is their concern with ends, intentions or goals as the key to the study of power. The result is that power is defined as the ability of one interactant to prevail in a situation of conflicting ends, and group behavior is thus reduced to the action of one individual in the group. Turk sees three problems with this approach: (1) It involves oversimplification since families do what they do because of the mutual activity of everyone, rather than because of the desires and actions of one individual. (2) The assumption that behavior is based upon ends ignores the fact that our awareness of ends is often retrospective, and develops in the course of action, rather than prior to the start of action. (3) A person is always involved in a multiplicity of relationships both within the family and outside of the family. These relationships are all intertwined and carried on simultaneously, with the result that it is impossible to regard action as having one end--it has implications for all the different relationships. Turk's suggested alternative is to start from the assumption that action is _emergent_ from the multiplicity of interests and activities in which group members are involved, and to concentrate on identifying the pattern of interaction by which the outcome is achieved.

In a consideration of specific methodological issues, the major proportion of studies are concerned with problems encountered in the use of the resources model of family power. Since these problems will be examined in greater detail in the section on methodological refinements, they will only be enumerated at this point.

The most frequently mentioned problem is the reliance of most studies on the wife as the source of data. This problem had already been isolated in earlier studies (Heer, 1962; Wilkening and Morrison, 1963; Scanzoni, 1965; Safilios-Rothschild, 1969, 1970), with few resulting changes in research procedure. Recent studies continue to point to this practise as a problem in the measurement of family power (Granbois and Willett, 1970; Centers et. al., 1971; Turk and Bell, 1972; Van Es and Shingi, 1972). For example, Granbois and Willett point out that the responses of husbands and wives were very similar when compared in the aggregate, but a comparison of individual spouses' responses revealed substantial discrepancies, with discrepant responses between husband and wife ranging from 35.6 to 59.5 percent.

A second issue which is raised is the representativeness of the sampling of decision areas (Safilios-Rothschild, 1969, 1970; Centers et. al., 1971; Turk, 1974). Safilios-Rothschild argues that a completely different picture of family power structure could emerge, depending on which decisions were included or omitted. This contention is supported by the finding of Centers et. al. that the husband's mean power drops when a list of fourteen decisions is used, even though the power score is very similar to that found by Blood and Wolfe when the eight Blood and Wolfe items are used.

Thirdly, the calculation and use of an overall decision-making score is questioned (Safilios-Rothschild, 1969, 1970; Cromwell, 1973). The result is that all decisions are given equal weight for each individual, despite the fact that each decision varies in importance and frequency for each individual.

Safilios-Rothschild (1969) and Olson and Ryder (1970) argue that

the decision-making instrument has never been tested for reliability or validity. This conclusion is tested by Turk and Bell (1972) and Olson and Rabunsky (1972), who find that there is a lack in reliability and validity in the traditional measurement of family power. These conclusions are questioned by Bahr (1972) who finds that the internal consistency of Blood and Wolfe's measure is substantial as determined by the coefficient of reproducibility and by alpha. Bahr concludes that in terms of measuring the dominant factor of decision-making, the Blood and Wolfe sample of eight decisions is a relatively efficient measure.

Finally, a number of recent studies have been concerned with the development of new approaches to the measurement of family power. Sprey (1971, 1972) emphasizes the necessity of moving from the consideration of the outcomes of family decisions to a consideration of the process of family interaction which leads to these outcomes. This represents a more dynamic approach to the measurement of family power. Suggestions for the measurement of family interaction are offered by Olson and Ryder (1970) and by Olson and Straus (1972). Fox (1973) takes us back to the resources model, but suggests the use of multiple classification analysis in the measurement of the relative contributions of husband, wife, and children to family power.

(2) Conceptual issues. Although the preponderant concern of family power studies has been with methodological issues, there have been a number of studies which have attempted to extend the conceptual analysis of family power into new areas, and to show how other variables are related to the power variable.

A number of studies have been concerned with general issues related to family power. Krupinski et. al. (1970) factor-analyzed the

presenting problems of 641 marriages coming for marital counseling in-
volving one or both spouses. One of the key dimensions of marital mal-
adjustment was the dominance-submission power struggle between husband
and wife. This finding emphasizes the importance of continued efforts
to extend our scientific understanding of family power relations.

Rodman (1972) spends much of his time in reviewing the evidence
for his "theory of resources in cultural context." An interesting var-
iation is his tentative presentation of four kinds of society, which
may represent four stages of societal development (Rodman, 1972:63-65).
The first stage is that of patriarchy, in which there is a high level
of paternal authority based on strong patriarchal family norms, with no
variation in paternal authority from one stratified group to another.
It is probable that Indian society approaches this ideal-type patri-
archy. The second stage is a modified patriarchy, in which patriarchal
family norms have been modified by equalitarian family norms at the
upper strata, with the result that paternal authority is inversely cor-
related with social class. An example would be Greece and Yugoslavia
which are characterized by patriarchal norms in the lower classes, and
more equalitarian norms in the upper strata. The third stage is tran-
sitional equalitarianism in which patriarchal norms are being replaced
by equalitarian norms, resulting in a normative flexibility about mari-
tal power. The result of this normative ambiguity is a "power struggle"
in which additional resources bring additional power, resulting in a
positive correlation of paternal authority and social class, as exem-
plified in Germany and the U.S.A. The final stage is that of equali-
tarianism, characterized by strong equalitarian family norms with a
high level of husband-wife sharing of power, and with no variation of

this pattern from one stratified group to another. Because equalitarian norms are so well established, there is no correlation between husband's power and husband's status. Examples of this kind of society are Denmark and Sweden.

The attempt to extend the conceptual analysis of family power into new areas has resulted in a group of studies which examine the relation between power and a number of other variables.

Bahr and Rollins (1971) study the effects of crisis on conjugal power. They find that the pre-crisis conjugal leader tends to be replaced as leader or to decrease significantly in relative power if he does not have an obvious solution to the crisis. The more equalitarian the power structure, the more likely it is to change during a crisis. These findings indicate the danger of viewing power from a static rather than a dynamic, interactional perspective.

Thomas et. al. (1972) explore the relationship between power and role-taking accuracy. The general proposition that persons in higher power positions do not need to and therefore do not use role-taking to the same degree as persons of lower power positions, is supported by their data which indicates that fathers are less accurate role-takers than mothers, and that mothers are significantly less accurate role-takers than their children.

The relation between conjugal organization and health is examined by Pratt (1972) who finds the level of health and health behavior of husbands and wives to be higher in marriages characterized by shared power, flexible division of tasks, and a high level of companionship, than in marriages characterized by unequal power, rigid sex-role differentiation, and a low level of companionship.

In an interesting study based on laboratory observation of the interaction of husband-wife-child groups involved in a problem-solving session, it was found that high husband power is associated with high marital satisfaction, whereas little difference was found in marital happiness when low and high-power wives were compared. It was also found that high parent-to-child power was associated with high marital happiness, but high child-to-parent power was associated with low marital happiness (Kolb and Straus, 1974).

The most recent attempt to provide conceptual clarification in the general area of marital power is provided by Rollins and Bahr (1975). They identify the five key concepts of authority, resources, power, control attempts, and control. The relationships between these five variables are specified by means of ten propositions.

(3) Exchange theory. It is very difficult to define the limits of exchange theory as various theoretical orientations have been regarded as falling within the broad purview of this approach. Singelman (1972), for example, explores the convergences between the theoretical orientations of symbolic interaction and exchange theory. He concludes that exchange can be fruitfully conceived as symbolic interaction in which human actions are viewed simultaneously as subjectively meaningful and as objective realities in their own right. Similarly, Heer (1963) and Rodman (1972) argue that the theory of resources as proposed by Blood and Wolfe is closely related to concepts found within exchange theory. The line of demarcation between exchange theory and the theory of resources is not always clear, but recent articles dealing generally with exchange theory, as well as those articles dealing specifically with the theory of resources will be examined.

In a perceptive series of articles Jetse Sprey (1969, 1971, 1972) takes issue with the traditional approach to the study of family power. He maintains that the treatment of family harmony and conflict in a consensus equilibrium framework is inadequate, and that instead the family should be viewed as a system in conflict in which the state of affairs remains open to continuous re-negotiation. "Conceptualizing the family as a system in conflict means to see its process as an on-going confrontation between its members, a confrontation between individuals with conflicting interests in their common situation" (Sprey, 1969:702). There is a clear recognition that family power structure is not rigid or permanent, but that it is rather fluid and subject to constant re-negotiation from one event or family cycle to another. Sprey argues that it therefore becomes necessary to concentrate on the process of family power rather than on the structure of power.

A number of different approaches have been used in recent studies in the assessment of family process. Bean and Kerckhoff (1971) make use of the Prisoner's Dilemma game in order to study how the personal characteristics of husbands and wives affect marital relations in terms of cooperation or noncooperation as demonstrated in the game. Personal characteristics are conceptualized in terms of the four dimensions of inclusion, affection, dominance, and achievement, which are viewed as the fundamental aspects of interpersonal behavior and personality. It was found that affection and inclusion were associated with cooperation, while dominance and achievement were associated with non-cooperation. Bahr and Rollins (1971) use the approach of SIMFAM in their study of family process to determine the effects of crisis on conjugal power. Hutchison (1974) uses the RDT (revealed difference

technique) of Strodtbeck to analyze various conjugal communication pat-
terns, and finds that the amount, type of resolution, and quality of
communication processes varies with the type of issue being discussed.

The insights of exchange theory are further utilized in two re-
cent research studies seeking to clarify the process of family power.
Edwards and Brauberger (1973) find support for their general hypothesis
of a relationship between the breakdown of intra-familial exchange and
parent-youth conflict. No significant relationships are found, how-
ever, between the key structural variables of alternative resources,
nuclear family isolation, family size, age composition, sex composition
and the dependent variable of intra-familial conflict. Family size is
the only structural variable which was found to have any relation to
the use of overt control techniques. Weiss et. al. (1974) apply be-
havior theory within the social exchange framework, particularly uti-
lizing the notions of exchange and reciprocity, to the problems of mar-
ital conflict. Their focus, however, is on the outcome of the negotia-
tion (i.e., the contract) rather than upon the techniques or process of
the negotiation.

Resource theory has provided the major framework within which
recent research on family power has been conducted. A good deal of
attention has been devoted to replication studies of the resource the-
ory of power. Oppong (1970), in an interesting departure, bases her
conclusions in support of the resource theory in urban Africa on a sam-
ple of men rather than of women. Both Centers et. al. (1971) and
Cromwell et. al. (1973) question the representativeness of the sampling
of decision areas accomplished by the eight decisions of Blood and
Wolfe. Both find similar results to those of Blood and Wolfe when the

eight decision areas are considered, but find a lower score on hus-
band's mean power when the decisions are increased to twelve (Cromwell
et. al.) or to fourteen (Centers et. al.). In addition, Cromwell et. al.
introduce the further dimensions of rare-frequent and external-internal
to the classification of decision areas. Liu et. al. do a replication
of Blood and Wolfe's findings by the use of the revealed difference
technique. Campbell (1970) examines the utility of resource theory in
an examination of the relation between the number and spacing of chil-
dren and the pattern of decision-making and task performance between
husband and wife.

Gillespie (1971) contradicts the findings of resource theory by
arguing that differences in marital power are not due to the control of
individual resources or the personal competence of the partners, but
that these differences are structurally predetermined in favor of the
male. Women as a class are structurally blocked from the traditional
sources of marital power--socialization, the marriage contract, income,
occupational prestige, organizational participation, education, sub-
urbanization, the family life-cycle, physical coercion. Gillespie con-
cludes that the egalitarian norm is a myth because husbands obtain
power in marriage not because of individual resources or personal com-
petence, but because of the discrimination against women in the larger
society.

Kandel and Lesser (1972) make an important contribution to the
further revision of the resource theory of marital power. Based on
their analysis of marital decision-making in Danish and American urban
families, they conclude that the socio-economic resources such as edu-
cation, occupation, and social status emphasized by resource theory may

be important not only because of their financial and status rewards, but also "because they are indicators of opportunities to gain experience in interpersonal and decision-making skills outside the family setting"(1972:137). The opportunity for the development of these interpersonal skills outside the family enhance the person's ability to use these skills within the family, and thus have important consequences for interaction within the family. These interpersonal skills may make more important contributions to the exercise of family power than the possession of the socio-economic resources themselves.

In an interesting application of resource theory, Fox (1973) moves beyond the usual attempt to correlate power with relative amounts of resources. The focus is on how much each spouse determines the distribution of power, regardless of whether the husband's power score is high or low. Through the use of the multivariate technique of multiple classification analysis, the gross impact of each spouse on power is partitioned into "joint" and "independent" contributions. It was found that "much of the impact of the husband's resources on power occurs as a result of their correlation with the wife's resources" (1973:726) or, in other words, that much of the husband's influence in the determination of power is a shared or joint effect with his wife. When the independent contributions of husband and wife are considered, the wife's contributions of resources make a greater impact than the husband's.

(4) Small group theory. Small group theory has sparked a great deal of research, but very little has been applied to the family in general, or to the concept of family power in particular. Indeed, Weick (1971) presents eleven properties of family problem solving which suggest that families fall on different portions of dimensions relevant

to problem solving than do non-family groups.

While recognizing the lack of comparability between families and small experimental groups, Tallman (1971) argues that structurally the family is a small group and hence generalizations derived from small group research should be applicable to the family. Tallman presents some interesting hypotheses regarding family structure which suggest that the family power structure needs to be assessed somewhat differently from what has been characteristic in family research. He indicates that one of the critical elements in effective problem solving is the flexibility of the power structure, and that the optimum structure would be one which becomes more open or decentralized over the family life cycle. He also suggests that the available channels of communication are more important from a problem solving perspective than whether the family is equalitarian or dominated by an individual. In other words, all competent family members should feel free to contribute to problem solutions. Tallman further argues that family consensus will be greater if the normative expectations with regard to power correspond to the actual power relations which gradually evolve out of interaction within the family. If the normative and actual power systems are discrepant, the distribution of affection and support will be more congruent with the informal system than with the formal system.

Smith (1970) suggests that the application of social power theory to research on parental influence upon adolescents could contribute to the study of both social power and parent-adolescent relationships. He examines parents' power to influence adolescents in terms of the model of social power as developed by French and Raven (1960) and as revised by Secord and Backman (1964) to include resources, dependen-

cies, and alternatives. The hypothesis that power resources, dependencies, and alternatives would operate jointly (i.e., that there would be statistical interaction between the three variables) in determining the parent's ability to influence the adolescent was not supported by the findings. Parental power resources account for far more of the variance in parental influence upon adolescents than either adolescent dependencies or alternatives. The correlations between parental influence and parental legitimate resources support the findings of other studies that normative power is important within the family.

In an interesting commentary on research with family groups as opposed to other small groups, Winter et. al. (1973) measure decision-making in married and unrelated couples. It was found that married couples showed greater spontaneous agreement with each other prior to conjoint discussion, less politeness to each other, more intrusive interruptions, and a lesser exchange of explicit information between husband and wife.

(5) Systems theory. Although the application of systems theory to the study of family power is suggested in a number of studies (Broderick, 1971; Sprey, 1971; Olson and Rabunsky, 1972; Turk, 1974), there are only two published attempts to apply systems theory concepts to family functioning in general in the survey of recent research studies. Alexander (1973) seeks to measure the interrelatedness of family units in terms of defensive and supportive communication, and how such communications were related to rates of son's aggressive behavior. He finds the son's aggression in school to be inversely related to father-to-son and mother-to-son supportive communications. Mother-to-son defensiveness was positively correlated with son's aggressiveness, but

this was not the case with father-to-son defensiveness. He concludes that "children who develop interpersonal styles (i.e., of moderate versus low aggressiveness) in one system (i.e., the family) will tend to express similar styles in a new (i.e., school) system" Alexander, 1973:616).

A more recent attempt (Bockus, 1975) to utilize systems theory in the analysis of family interaction conceives of marital communication and negotiation as a cybernetic system, composed of five subsystems: the need assessment process; the goal setting process; the design process; the implementation process; and the evaluation process. Each of the subsystems are interrelated with the other processes, and with the system as a whole. While this formulation does isolate important components of the negotiation process, it does not enable us to analyze the flow of negotiation and bargaining between marital or family units.

4. <u>Statement of crucial issues</u>. The preceding review of the literature gives some indication of the complexity and of the contradictory nature of the research dealing with family power structure. Recent research has done little to correct basic weaknesses in previous discussions of the family power concept. A limited number of studies provide exceptions to the above statement.

Turk and Bell (1972) and Olson and Rabunsky (1972) have focused further attention on Safilios-Rothschild's (1970) analysis of methodological weaknesses in studies of family power. Fox (1973) provides an important contribution to methodological refinement through her suggested use of the technique of multiple classification analysis.

An important contribution to the conceptual clarification of the

resources theory of power is provided by Kandel and Lesser's (1972) argument that experience in interpersonal and decision-making skills outside the family setting may make more important contributions to the exercise of family power than the possession of the socio-economic resources suggested by resource theory.

The most significant contribution of recent studies (Sprey, 1969, 1971, 1972; Scanzoni, 1970, 1972; Turk and Bell, 1972; Olson and Rabunsky, 1972; Turk, 1974) has been the persistent demand that the analysis of family power move beyond the static consideration of the outcomes of family power to a more dynamic understanding of the process of family power. Such an understanding requires the utilization of modern systems theory.

A careful consideration of the literature reviewed above suggests three crucial issues in the further study of family power. First, is the need to provide both conceptual and methodological clarification in the area of family power studies. Such clarification would greatly assist in the understanding and explanation of family power. Second, is the need to move beyond the static or structural model of family power to a more dynamic understanding of the process of family interaction. Third, is the need to integrate the contributions of various theoretical approaches in a more effective approach to the problems of family power. These issues will be addressed in the following sections of this thesis.

III. CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVES

1. The Structural Model. One of the crucial issues isolated in the preceding review of the literature is the need for conceptual clarification to take place before proceeding with any further studies of family power. Turk (1974) is doubtful that such conceptual clarification can be accomplished, and suggests that a completely different approach needs to be taken. The understanding of family power is crucial, however, and continuing efforts need to be made to bring further clarification to this elusive concept, particularly on the structural level.

Safilios-Rothschild (1970) draws attention to the fact that research has not resulted in clear conceptualization of the idea of the family power structure. Researchers have used interchangeably the terms "family power" or "power structure" and the terms "decision-making," "family authority," and "influence." Thus a term may be defined by one investigator in the same way that a different term is defined by another researcher. Similarly, the same term may be defined differently by different authors. She points out that, in general, survey studies have tended to measure only decision-making, and to treat the findings as referring to family power. In contrast, observational studies tend to consider influence or control as central to an understanding of family power.

Safilios-Rothschild (1970:540) defines family power as a "multidimensional concept that is measured indirectly through behavioral acts in which the degree of one's power is put to the test." She suggests that family power can then be measured through the outcome of decision-

making, the patterns of tension and conflict management, or the type of prevailing division of labor. It is the total configuration of these behavioral patterns, however, which tend to reflect the prevailing model of power, rather than any of these patterns seen in isolation. Even decision-making, it is argued, is a multiphasic process, with the different phases pointing to other crucial dimensions of power such as influence and authority.

The foregoing adds a great deal to the conceptual clarification of the power concept, but it does not provide a sufficient theoretical base to enable a researcher to utilize the various indicators which have been isolated in different studies of family power. An analysis of the concepts used in various family power studies indicates that there are three basic dimensions which are utilized in measuring power structure, regardless of whether the outcome of decision-making, the patterns of tension and conflict management, or the type of prevailing division of labor is being measured. These are the normative dimension, the perceptual dimension, and the behavioral dimension. The complete articulation of family power requires that each of these dimensions be taken into account.

The seminal study which has led to this articulation of family power is that of Larson (1972a), which applies and integrates various insights of the developmental, symbolic interaction, and systems approaches in the wider study of the family. Larson analyzes the individual in interaction from several different perspectives. The first of these is from the viewpoint of the individual subsystem, within which the three basic components of norms, covert behavior, and overt behavior are identified. This is the perspective which has been used

as the basis for the present articulation of family power. The second
perspective is the time dimension, which assumes the possibility of
change over time within the individual subsystem components. The third
perspective is that of interaction between individuals, and permits the
analysis of interaction between the various subsystems of the family
over time.

It is the first perspective which has become the basis of the
present analysis of the family power structure. This analysis omits
the second perspective of time sequence as not being necessary for our
present understanding. This is because structural studies of family
power do not take the time dimension into consideration and, indeed,
find it impossible to do so. This dimension, however, will be consid-
ered in the systems model of family power. One aspect of the third
perspective, that of the interaction between family subsystems will
receive further development in the present structural approach.

An examination of Figure 1 indicates both similarities and dif-
ferences between the two models. The most important difference is in
the scope of the models--Larson's model is an attempt to portray any
and every aspect of family interaction, whereas the current approach is
an attempt to apply this understanding to the more restricted and more
specific area of family power. Also, Larson's model is a processual
model, even though it focuses on key issues of structural organization.
Both of these differences arise from the different purposes of the two
models. Larson (1972a:3) states the purpose of his model as "a device
to organize and integrate the central analytical issues in the social
psychology of marriage and family structure and interaction. In this
sense, the model may be seen as a teaching device." A further purpose

FIGURE 1: COMPARISON OF LARSON AND GOLTZ

LARSON   GOLTZ

for the model is seen in that it "provides an excellent diagnostic and analytical tool in family study. It is not a theory but is instead seen as a classification and sorting device." Larson concludes (1972:18) that although the model "is appropriately referred to as a category scheme, it is suggested that the model has theoretical potential." The present approach is an attempt to test and apply the theoretical insights implicit in Larson's model, and to provide a methodological application of these insights in a particular area of family interaction, namely the area of family power.

Three basic components or dimensions are identified in each model. A comparison of these dimensions reveals the basic similarity between the two models. The normative dimension is utilized in both models as referring to the applicable expectations for behavior held by the individuals involved in interaction. Larson's model uses the term "covert behavior" to refer to the "internal cognitive processes exercised by the individual in initiating action in an interactional context" (Larson, 1972a:10), utilizing both role-taking and role-modification. The present family power model uses the term "perception" to refer to these same internal cognitive processes utilized in any interaction event. Finally, overt behavior in Larson's model simply refers to the action of the individual, which in the family power model is conceptualized as "behavior."

This categorization of family power in terms of the normative, perceptual, and behavioral dimensions does not move beyond the static model. It is rather an attempt to clarify the concepts which have been traditionally used in studies of family power. The discussion of the dynamic measurement of family power will come at a later point. Most

studies of family power have approached the subject from a structural point of view. A comparison of the various studies has indicated the variability and incomparability of the findings. The introduction of these three dimensions constitutes a first step toward the introduction of conceptual clarity in the study of family power.

The operationalization of the normative, perceptual, and behavioral dimensions of power draws heavily from the contributions of French and Raven (1960) and Olson and Rabunsky (1972). These two studies are representative of two diverse orientations to power. The French and Raven study emerges from the tradition of small groups research and falls within the framework of the more general social power research. The Olson and Rabunsky study derives its basic approach from the resources theory of family power. An examination of the concepts used by these two major approaches reveals close similarities. The categorization of these concepts in terms of the normative, perceptual, and behavioral dimensions of power enables us to bring about a preliminary integration of these two diverse orientations to the problem of family power (Figure 2). It is anticipated that this will provide a conceptual framework for the future categorization of concepts utilized in various family power studies.

In order to extend the theoretical insights provided by the model under discussion, it becomes necessary to proceed to the definition and exploration of the conceptual framework, and to an examination of how this conceptual framework has been operationalized in these research approaches.

The normative dimension of family interaction has been the particular concern of the developmental approach to the family. Although

FIGURE 2:   COMPARISON OF CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES TO POWER

| CONCEPTS | INDICATORS | OLSON AND RABUNSKY | FRENCH AND RAVEN |

the developmental approach is usually associated with the concept of family life-cycle stages, it must be kept in mind that this approach drew heavily upon other approaches to arrive at its basic concepts (Hill and Rodgers, 1964). One of the key concepts was the idea of the family being engaged in internal interactive behavior within the system (based on Burgess' definition of the family as a "unity of interacting person- alities"), as well as the idea of the transactive behavior of the family with other systems of the society. Hill and Rodgers (1964:178) point out further that in analyzing the patterns of interaction of the family system, the developmental approach adapted the basic definitions of Bates (1956:314) as follows:

1. Position: A location in a social structure which is associated with a set of social norms.
2. Role: A part of a social position consisting of a more or less integrated or related subset of social norms which is distinguish- able from other sets of norms forming the same position.
3. Norm: A patterned or commonly held behavior expectation. A learned response, held in common by members of a group.

Building upon these basic concepts, the family was then defined as "a system of positions composed of reciprocal roles defined in terms of both familial and societal norms" (Hill and Rodgers, 1964:179). Dif- fering norms are applied at differing developmental stages, thus account- ing for the possibility of change in the system. Other concepts such as role behavior, sanctions, role sequence, role cluster, role complex, positional career, and family career were developed in order to further expand the explanatory power of the approach.

In terms of family interaction in general, and family power in particular, norms can be simply defined as shared expectations of be- havior or as shared behavioral rules. A further distinction needs to be made between cultural norms, subcultural norms, family norms, and

individual norms. With respect to the normative dimension of family

power, we should expect a certain amount of variation from one family

to another due to the heterogeneous nature of the society in which we

live (compare Cromwell et al., 1973). Goode (1960:484) supports this

contention:

> Even when "the norms of society" are fully accepted by the indi-
> vidual, they are not adequate guides for individual action. Order
> cannot be imposed by any general solution for all role decisions,
> since the total set of role obligations is probably unique for
> every individual.

In our day of rapid social change we can expect to see increasing

role strain, with a resulting confusion within the normative dimension

(compare Rodman, 1972). This is particularly the case with reference

to family power in light of the rapid movement toward a more egalitarian

ideology. Goode (1963:21) comments upon this confusion as follows:

"Lower class men concede fewer rights ideologically than their women in

fact obtain, and the more educated men are more likely to concede more

rights ideologically than they in fact grant." Aldous (1974) suggests

that this movement toward changing conjugal relationships leads to the

making of new family roles, with an attendant confusion regarding nor-

mative boundaries. She concludes (1974:234):

> Role making does permit greater freedom for personal and couple
> development and gives the couple a greater potential for adapting
> to change as well as creating it. On the other hand, the less
> stable family structures that result from role making may create
> confusion and heighten conflict by making salient a broad range of
> alternative behaviors.

Similarly, Rodman (1972:62) indicates that insofar as there is a

lack of clarity in the cultural norms as to who can legitimately exer-

cise authority, decision-making becomes problematic and the development

of the power structure becomes highly relevant. Even if the norms are

relatively clear, adjustments between husband and wife still need to be worked out in the process of marital interaction. Rodman concludes (1972:67) that whether "from a cultural level or from an interactional level, the evidence suggests that normative patterns of marital power will develop or the family will be characterized by pathology."

The normative dimension of family power is operationalized as "authority." Safilios-Rothschild (1970:540) indicates that a "spouse has the authority to make decisions (or to be the most powerful one in the family), when cultural or social norms designated him as the ex officio 'rightful' person." In our own culture the husband has been traditionally assigned this right, although recent ideological shifts and social changes concerning the status of women are bringing about significant changes in this area.

French and Raven (1960) refer to this dimension of power as "legitimate power." According to their definition, legitimate power involves some sort of code or standard accepted by the individual by virtue of which the external agent can assert his power. Legitimate power is derived from group norms which, in Linton's (1945) terms, may be universals for everyone in the culture, alternatives (the individual having a choice as to whether or not to accept them) or specialties (specific to given positions). This underlines the distinction noted above between cultural norms, subcultural norms, family norms, and individual norms. Legitimate power, according to French and Raven, involves the concept of "oughtness," and will elicit such expressions as "should," "ought to," or "has a right to." The person not only feels that he should engage in a particular activity, but that all others ought to behave in the same way. Thus legitimacy is induced by some

internalized norm or value which has its base in cultural values, in acceptance of the social structure, or in designation by a legitimizing agency. The legitimacy of attempts to use other types of power also need to be considered. In certain cases an individual will be regarded as having a legitimate right to threaten punishment for nonconformity (for example, parent to child); whereas in other cases such use of coercion would not be considered legitimate (parent to child, when child is no longer a minor).

Olson and Rabunsky (1972:227) define their measure of authority in terms of who has the legitimate right to exercise power in regard to any particular decision. They indicate that the description of authority is heavily influenced by the cultural role prescriptions and expectations, with the result that "the authority measure is tapping more what the relationship should be like rather than what it actually is like" (Olson and Rabunsky, 1972:228). This is not surprising, but is rather exactly what we would have expected in terms of our definition of authority representing the normative dimension of family power, and the possible differences between the formal and informal distribution of marital power.

Lennard and Bernstein (1969:84) suggest that because of the complexity of the interaction process, individuals are generally unaware of norms while they are interacting. Maintaining total awareness of social norms which govern our behavior during interaction is similar to thinking about principles of grammar and syntax while carrying on a conversation. It is only when the norm has been violated that an awareness of the norm emerges.

The introduction of the perceptual dimension of family power

clearly indicates the contribution of symbolic interaction to an under-
standing of family interaction. Safilios-Rothschild (1970:544) indicates
that perception of family power is a very important variable because "it
is each person's perceived 'reality' that affects his behavior, the
style and quality of interpersonal relationships and, finally, the type
of husband-wife and parent-child relationship." The basic assumption
of symbolic interaction involved in this particular analysis is that
interaction must be understood in terms of the definition of the situa-
tion. According to this approach, if a situation is perceived to be
real, then it is real in its consequences for the individuals involved.
Stryker (1964:135) argues: "Humans do not respond to the environment
as physically given, but to an environment as it is mediated through
symbolic processes--to a symbolic environment." The fundamental meth-
odological principle arising from this assumption is that the investi-
gator must see the world from the point of view of the subject of his
investigation.

Blumer (1966:542) draws the following implications for the study
of action from the position of the actor:

> Since action is forged by the actor out of what he perceives,
> interprets, and judges, one would have to see the operating situa-
> tion as the actor sees it, perceive objects as the actor perceives
> them, ascertain their meaning in terms of the meaning they have
> for the actor, and follow the actor's line of conduct as the actor
> organizes it--in short, one would have to take the role of the
> actor and see his world from his standpoint.

Wiseman (1974:11) presents a symbolic interaction paradigm which
represents the process by which people define situations and then use
these definitions to "build up" acts in response to their definition of
the situation:

1. Awareness of a need to act.

2. Selective perception of the situation, including persons and objects involved. (What is perceived will depend on a person's past history, his social structure, culture, and the situation itself.)

3. Definition of that situation, which would include consideration of at least the following--

    a. Various cultural meanings of the object, as well as ideosyncratic ones possible to this situation.

    b. Expected normative behavior on the part of all participants.

    c. Meanings of persons and objects involved (status, power, danger, charity, etc.)

    d. The total configuration of the situation, that is, all objects and actors defined within the context of each other in the situation.

4. Once the situation is defined, the individual mentally considers alternative actions. He may even dramatize them in his head, mentally acting out the parts as he might expect them to be played.

5. The actor chooses one alternative course and implements it (which could include "no action" as a possibility).

6. Putting himself in the place of the other persons in the situation, he constantly checks the effect of his selected action on them, adjusting and readjusting his action in hopes of getting the desired effect from them.

7. The foregoing always includes consideration of the self as paramount.

It is evident from this paradigm that it is impossible to predict actions on the basis of attitude alone, or on the basis of the person's normative dimension. All action occurs within the context of the situation, and expected responses can be changed within the course of the action itself, depending on the reactions received from other persons involved. Blumer (1966:538) argues that in this process of taking account of each other's ongoing acts participants "have to arrest, reorganize, or adjust their own intentions, wishes, feelings, and attitudes; similarly, they have to judge the fitness of norms, values, and group prescriptions for the situation being formed by the acts of others." In addition, when the impulsive or idiosyncratic side of the self is presumed, it becomes evident why a particular action or response cannot be predicted with any major degree of certainty. It may be the case that only habitual or non-problematical behavior can be predicted,

whereas problematical behavior depends to a much greater extent on the interaction of the normative, perceptual, and behavioral dimensions, with each of these dimensions being primary in determining behavior at different times and in different situations. At any rate, the perceptual frame of reference is extremely important in assessing and understanding the nature of family interaction.

The perceptual dimension of family power is operationalized as "predicted power" and "retrospective power," in keeping with the designations used by Olson and Rabunsky (1972). Both of these indicators of perceptual power are based upon the self-report of the subject, and are further based on outcome measures of decision. Predicted power is based upon the question of who would make a particular decision, and hence is determined prior to the actual decision. Retrospective power, in contrast, is based on the question of who made a particular decision, and hence is determined subsequent to the actual decision.

French and Raven (1960) also discuss two indicators of power on the perceptual level. The first of these is referent power, which has its basis in the identification of one person with another, and results in similar behavior, beliefs, and perceptions. The idea of "reference groups" and "prestige suggestion" may be treated as instances of referent power. It thus appears that referent power is based on the person's perception of what the other is like, and the desire to behave or believe as the other does. French and Raven's concept of expert power is based on the perception of one person that another person possesses certain knowledge or perception within a given area, resulting in an attitude of deference to his opinions or desires. The expert is seen as having superior knowledge or ability in very specific areas, and his

power will generally be limited to these areas, although some "halo effect" may occur. Expert power, similar to referent power, is based upon perception, and thus falls clearly within the perceptual dimension.

Since our indicators and definitions of perceptual power are drawn directly from Olson and Rabunsky (1972), there is no further need to elaborate on their definitions. We would, however, disagree with their conclusions regarding the applicability of perceptual measures of power. They indicate (1972:231) that these measures may be useful indicators of "subjective reality," but that they are not valid measures of "objective reality." In their view, such a distinction is important because "researchers have often assumed that in using self-reports of wives to obtain measures of the family power structure they are obtaining valid measures of 'objective reality.' What they are really dealing with are invalid measures which only describe 'subjective reality.'"

While it may be true that perceived power is only measuring "subjective reality," it is inappropriate to assume that this measure is unimportant in assessing family power. Indeed, it is even more important to seek to determine why perceptual distortions of family power take place, and whether there is any systematic relationship between perceptual distortions and the normative and behavioral dimensions. Safilios-Rothschild (1972:23) makes the following observation:

> Because the perception of the familial power structure is greatly
> influenced by the spouse's needs, motivations, self-concept, ideol-
> ogical commitments as well as by the nature of the existing marital
> relationship and the degree of satisfaction with it, the familial
> power assessment of the one spouse often differs significantly from
> that made by the other. Since this assessment is to a considerable
> extent also technically difficult, each spouse tends to focus on
> those power processes which are consistent with his (her) preferred
> power distribution model. But since it is the perceived reality
> that affects and determines people's behavior, it is this perceived
> rather than any type of "objectively" determined power structure

that is valid for each spouse.

The various levels of perception for each individual within the family system, as well as for different sub-groups or subsystems of the family has been examined in a recent paper (Larson, Goltz, Howell and Kuhn, 1973). The paper demonstrates the complexity involved in the process of perception by pointing out that a "family of four contains no less than 40 interpersonal perceptions of a single cue X" (1973:11). It is apparent from this analysis that perceptual studies have only scratched the surface of various possibilities, and that a great deal of work remains to be done in this area.

The final dimension being utilized in this study is the behavioral dimension. The introduction of this dimension is an implicit recognition that there may be a difference between "subjective reality" as measured by perception, and "objective reality" as measured by behavior. This involves an attempt to measure what family members are observed to do, rather than what they merely report doing. Olson (1969) found no relationship between the normative dimension of power (authority) and the perceived dimension of power, nor between the perceived dimension of power (as measured by self-report predictions) and the behavioral dimension of power (as measured by actual outcome of decisions). He found a very strong relationship between authority (normative dimension) and actual power (behavioral dimension). Though he asserts, on the basis of his data, that it is impossible to determine which approach is most valid, he does "speculate that the behavioral measure of actual power is most valid because it required the couple to jointly discuss these problems and make mutually acceptable decisions which they were

asked to abide by after participating in the study" (1969:550).

At the same time, as argued by Safilios-Rothschild (1970:544), it needs to be recognized that even in a behavioral measure, "one or more observers' perceptions of the on-going processes intervene between us and the 'real' patterns of power structure." Kenkel (1961) demonstrates that the decision-making process and the observed power structure are greatly influenced by the sex of the observer. Thus wives tended to take a more active and powerful role in the decision-making when the observer was a woman. We must therefore beware of uncritically accepting observation measures as by far superior to the "inadequate and unreliable" survey techniques. The approach of this study is to accept both survey and observational techniques as measuring some dimension of the family power structure. We would agree with Safilios-Rothschild (1970:546) that "it is more important to determine which dimensions of power can be measured by each type of technique and use a combination of techniques for the assessment of power." It is maintained that the normative and perceptual dimensions may be more readily measured by survey techniques, whereas the behavioral dimension may be more readily measured by an observational approach. The discrepancy between the various dimensions of power, rather than being indicative of invalid measures, may actually be helpful in analyzing the dynamics of family power.

The behavioral dimension of family power is operationalized as "influence" and "force or its threat." Safilios-Rothschild (1972b:8) defines influence as "the degree to which formal or informal, overt or covert pressure of some kind is successfully exerted by the one spouse, on the other, so that his (her) point of view is imposed about a

pending decision despite initial opposition on the part of the other spouse." In her Detroit study, Safilios-Rothschild finds that both men and women exert influence power, but that men tend to rely to a greater extent on verbal techniques such as discussion and persuasion, whereas "women rely much more on 'nonverbal techniques' such as, 'sweet talk and affection,' 'anger, crying, pouting, silent treatment'" (1972b:9).

Similarly, Kenkel (1963:148) defines influence as "the degree to which a person is able to have his own wishes reflected in the decision of the group." Influence then refers to the share which an individual has in the origination of what becomes the family decision.

Influence is operationalized by French and Raven (1960) as "reward power." The basis of reward power is simply the ability of the powerful person to provide appropriate rewards. The reward power is specific to those regions within which one individual can reward another for conforming.

The second aspect of the behavioral dimension of power is that of "force or its threat." Goode (1971) points out that the family, in common with all other social units or systems, is a power system, and thus rests to some degree on force or its threat. He further differentiates between legitimate force and illegitimate force, that is, violence. Straus (1972:FN1), in contrast, differentiates between violence which is legitimate according to the norms of the society or group (such as spanking a child in most societies) and illegitimate violence (such as spanking a wife in contemporary American society). Goode maintains that force or its threat can be used both to persuade others to do something as well as to avoid doing something. He emphasizes that we need not be conscious of force, nor does it need to be visible, in

order for it to be present. People have been socialized to accept

their own family structure and to take it for granted, so that they

never really test whether force would be applied if they challenged it.

Thus, force plays a role, even when no deviant act is actually committed.

The result is that we are unlikely to observe the application of force,

but its threat creates a relatively stable, unchallenged set of under-

standings, behaviors, and imbalances of influence or dominance. Force

or its threat may be more important in the process of socialization

(particularly in parent-child relationships), than in normal adult

interaction. At the same time, it cannot be ruled out for adult inter-

action. Thus Komarovsky (1967:227) reports that one woman said of her

husband: "He is a big man and terribly strong. One time when he got

sore at me, he pulled off the banister and he ripped up three steps."

It is reported that this woman realized, with the evidence of this dam-

age in view, what her husband could do to her if he should decide to

strike her. Similarly, Goode (1956:121-125) found that 32 percent of

the wives reported the authority or dominance attempts of their husband

as being one of the chief contributing factors to their divorce. Goode

comments:

> It is not so much that beating and cruelty are viewed as an obvious
> male right in marriage, but only that this is one of the techniques
> used from time to time, and with little or no subsequent guilt, for
> keeping control over the wife. This attitude is given much less
> overt expression in the middle and upper strata, where a philosophy
> of equalitarianism is often given lip service....In our society,
> the husband who successfully asserts his dominance does enjoy some
> approval and even a modicum of envy from other males. Male domi-
> nance is to some extent actually approved (1956:122).

Whereas reward power is much more positive in French and Raven's

conceptualization, coercive power is negative in that it is based on the

expectation of punishment for failure to conform to the influence attempt.

In this respect, it is very similar to the use of force or its threat in order to gain compliance with a request. The strength of coercive power depends on the magnitude of the threatened punishment multiplied by the perceived probability of avoiding the punishment by conformity.

Olson and Rabunsky's (1972) "process power" and "outcome power" are both behavioral measures of power. Process power is assessed at the joint discussion stage by utilizing the revealed difference technique to arrive at an understanding of power. The person whose preference prevailed on items on which the couples initially disagreed was said to exercise power. Outcome power is assessed by a follow-up questionnaire, but is obtained by comparing the final decision made by the couple on those items in which the spouses had initially disagreed in terms of their individual preferences. Both of these measures are thus behavioral measures, and are closely related to the operation of influence or of force and its threat.

The question naturally arises regarding the relationship between influence and force or its threat. It is proposed that these two concepts fall on a continuum, with influence at the weaker end of the continuum, and force or its threat at the more intense end of the continuum. Some further preliminary distinctions between influence and force or its threat can be suggested. Influence would tend to be verbal, whereas force or its threat, though it may be expressed verbally, would tend to have more physical and/or behavioral overtones. Influence can be more easily accepted or rejected by the person being influenced, whereas force has certain sanctions that can be invoked which makes it more difficult, but not impossible, to be rejected. Influence can be used by either the more powerful, or the less powerful, individual in the

interaction. Force, in contrast, would be more likely to be used by the more powerful individual in the interaction. Both influence and force can be either conscious or unconscious. While it might be somewhat difficult to distinguish unconscious force from influence, the distinction would need to be made on the basis of the sanctions which can be invoked by force. Force would be more likely to be used in parent-child relationships than in adult interaction within the family because of the power differential. Parents have more power than children and are likely to use force or its threat in order to obtain obedience from children. The marital relationship tends to be more egalitarian, and hence there is less resort to the use of force or its threat, although it is certainly not precluded as previous references to the studies of Komarovsky and Goode have indicated. Force or its threat may be used more readily where there is a normative structure supporting its demands, as in the parents' expectation of obedience from children. That it is not absent from husband-wife relations is demonstrated by Goode's comment that there is a "strong reservoir of attitude on the part of the American male generally that he has a right to tell his wife what to do. This attitude is given more overt expression, and is more frequently backed by force, in the lower strata" (Goode, 1956: 122). This indicates some normative support for the use of force, particularly in the lower classes.

Figure 2 represented the relations between the various conceptual approaches to power. As already indicated, the French and Raven portrayal comes out of empirical work within the small group tradition. The Olson and Rabunsky study is an indication of the increased interest in, and emphasis on, both conceptual and methodological refinements in

the study of the family power structure within the broad resources framework. The dependence of the present study on both of these models is clearly evident. At the same time, the further conceptual clarification in terms of the normative, perceptual, and behavioral dimensions helps to organize and categorize the approach, and further helps us to understand why there has been little relation between the conceptual indicators in the various studies of family power. The normative, perceptual, and behavioral dimensions are not synonymous, but rather represent different aspects of power. In addition, the presence or absence of correlations between various dimensions of power within a particular family may help to isolate problem areas, and may eventually lead to a much deeper understanding of the family power system. This approach opens up several new areas of potential research and investigation.

One possibility is in examining the patterns of correlation between the normative, perceptual, and behavioral dimensions. Thus, for example, Olson and Rabunsky (1972:228), when using predicted power as a measure of perception, find a negative correlation between the normative and perceptual measures, a negative correlation between the perceptual and behavioral measures, and a positive correlation between the normative and behavioral measures. On the other hand, when using retrospective power as a measure of perception, they find a positive correlation between the normative and perceptual measures, a nonsignificant positive correlation between the perceptual and behavioral measures, and a positive correlation between the normative and behavioral measures.

This kind of comparison suggests the following typology (Table 1), on the basis of which several different kinds of family relations could be differentiated. The question to be investigated is whether different

TABLE 1:   CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERCEPTIONS, NORMS, AND BEHAVIOR

NORMS AND PERCEPTION	PERCEPTION AND BEHAVIOR	NORMS AND BEHAVIOR
+ (positive)	+ (positive)	+ (positive)
+	+	- (negative)
+	-	-
+	-	+
-	-	-
-	+	+
-	+	-
-	-	+

patterns of correlations are capable of isolating different kinds of family interaction, leading to a possible diagnosis of possible problem areas within particular families.

The above typology may be further extended to at least three levels of congruence or lack of congruence (Table 2). Such extension provides a more detailed analysis of the "fit" between various dimensions of family power.

The first level determines intrapersonal congruence. This level assumes that an individual's (ego or alter) perceptions may be congruent or incongruent with his norms; that his perceptions may be congruent or incongruent with his behavior; and, that his norms and behavior may be congruent or incongruent. Incongruence between any two of these dimensions would tend to cause intra-personal conflict, which would ultimately have some effect on interpersonal relationships.

The second level of analysis examines interpersonal congruence. This level determines if there is congruence between the perceptions of ego and the perceptions of alter; if there is congruence between the norms of ego and the norms of alter; and, if there is congruence between the behavior of ego and the behavior of alter.

The third level of analysis considers interpersonal-inter-dimensional congruence. This is the most complex level of analysis. This level examines if there is congruence between the perception of ego and the norms of alter or vice versa; if there is congruence between the perception of ego and the behavior of alter, and vice versa; and, if there is congruence between the norms of ego and the behavior of alter, and vice versa.

The first level of congruence has been systematically investigated

TABLE 2: CONGRUENCE BETWEEN PERCEPTION, NORMS AND BEHAVIOR

LEVEL I: INTRAPERSONAL CONGRUENCE

KEY TO TABLE 2:

P - perception
N - norms
B - behavior
E - Ego
A - Alter
$\pm$ - positive or negative correlation

PERCEPTION AND NORMS

PE $\pm$ NE
PA $\pm$ PE

PERCEPTION AND BEHAVIOR

PE $\pm$ BE
PA $\pm$ BA

NORMS AND BEHAVIOR

NE $\pm$ BE
NA $\pm$ BA

LEVEL II: INTERPERSONAL CONGRUENCE

PERCEPTION

PE $\pm$ PA

NORMS

NE $\pm$ NA

BEHAVIOR

BE $\pm$ BA

LEVEL III: INTERPERSONAL-INTERDIMENSIONAL CONGRUENCE

PERCEPTION AND NORMS

PE $\pm$ NA
PA $\pm$ NE

PERCEPTION AND BEHAVIOR

PE $\pm$ BA
PA $\pm$ BE

NORMS AND BEHAVIOR

NE $\pm$ BA
NA $\pm$ BE

and discussed by the psychoanalysts. This level is generally over-looked by sociological investigators, or is even disparaged by such investigators (Scanzoni, 1972). The second level has received some attention in family power studies (Granbois and Willet, 1970; Olson and Rabunsky, 1972; Turk and Bell, 1972), although the implications of a lack of congruence between interacting individuals have never been investigated, or the lack of congruence has simply been attributed to conceptual or methodological weaknesses. The third level of analysis has not been investigated in terms of family power relations.

Not only does the application of the normative, perceptual, and behavioral dimensions apply to decision-making, but it is also possible to broaden the range so that this analysis becomes applicable to the family power structure in general. Safilios-Rothschild (1970:540) de-fined family power as "a multidimensional concept that is measured indirectly through behavioral acts in which the degree of one's power is put to the test." Thus, it is maintained, the outcome of decision-making, the patterns of tension and conflict management, or the type of prevailing division of labor are all measures of familial power. It is impossible to regard any one of these measures as being synonymous with family power, but rather the prevailing model of power is reflected by the total configuration of these measures. Furthermore, each of these measures of power needs to be analyzed in terms of the underlying norma-tive, perceptual, and behavioral dimensions. Figure 3 portrays in visual form the application of this approach to family power, and is considered as basic to an understanding of the kinds of relationships which are involved in the family power structure.

Family power is represented in this figure as multidimensional

FIGURE 3: CONCEPTUALIZATION OF FAMILY POWER STRUCTURE

in nature, being the outcome of the interrelationship of decision-
making, division of labor, and tension and conflict management. The
various indicators of each of these dimensions of power further need to
be seen in terms of the interrelationships of norms, perceptions, and
behavior. Thus, decision-making needs to be analyzed in terms of its
normative, perceptual, and behavioral dimensions, and of the interrela-
tionships of these dimensions. Finally, the interrelationship of norms
governing decision-making, division of labor, and patterns of tension and
conflict management; the perceptions of decision-making, division of
labor, and patterns of tension and conflict management; and, behavior
related to decision-making, division of labor and patterns of tension
and conflict management, needs to be analyzed. It is this total con-
figuration of dimensions and their interrelationship that demonstrates
the nature of family power structure. Such an analysis gives a more
detailed and more complete picture of the family power structure.

It needs to be recognized, however, that even this extended
analysis of family power falls short of an understanding of the dynamic
aspects of the family power structure. All of these measures are
merely outcome measures of power because all of the studies as presently
set up have only measured the outcome of decision-making, or the outcome
of division of labor, or the outcome of patterns of tension and conflict
management. In none of these studies has there been an attempt to
analyze the process by which these outcomes are arrived at. Even Olson
and Rabunsky's measure of "process power" is nothing more than an out-
come measure of power. This should not be interpreted to mean that out-
come measures are of no value. On the contrary, they can give us a
great deal of insight into the family power structure. From this point

of view they need to be retained. The point is that we need to extend

our understanding of family power beyond these outcome measures in

order to gain a complete picture. It therefore becomes necessary to

proceed to an analysis of the process of family power, and to an under-

standing of the further insights gained from such an approach.

2. The Dynamic Model. A number of researchers (Edwards, 1969; Sprey,

1969, 1971, 1972; Scanzoni, 1970, 1972; Turk and Bell, 1972; Olson and

Rabunsky, 1972; Turk, 1974) have been urging the necessity of a more

dynamic view of the process of family power. Despite their eloquent

appeals, very little concrete work has been done in the presentation of

a model that can handle this kind of analysis.

Olson and Rabunsky (1972:232) comment:

> If family investigators are truly interested in studying family
> process such as occurs in decision-making and conflict resolution,
> they need to utilize a dynamic conceptual model that deals with
> the reciprocal nature of the family discussions and negotiations
> that take place rather than utilize a static model which focuses
> on the outcome of family process. An alternative dynamic model
> would utilize concepts and principles from system theory. It would
> focus on communication processes and would attempt to delineate the
> strategies and counter-strategies that are used in the process of
> negotiating and resolving conflict. This approach would be less
> concerned with who wins, i.e., outcome, than with the process by
> which the couple arrived at a given decision or point of impasse.

Similarly, Jetse Sprey (1969:702) maintains that to conceptual-

ize the family as a system in conflict "means to see its process as an

ongoing confrontation between its members, a confrontation between

individuals with conflicting interests in their common situation."

Sprey goes on to define the family as an arena in which conflicting

interests contend rather than as an organism seeking stable equilibrium.

As a process then, the family is conceived as "an ongoing peace-making

effort which may result in a negotiated order, a state of affairs which

remains, however, open to continuous re-negotiation" (1969:702).

In a subsequent paper Sprey (1972:236) argues that our analytical focus needs to shift from a concern with the power of the individual members to a concern with "powering" which is defined as "the ongoing confrontation in which the power inputs of all participants are reciprocally put to the test." It is this process which determines the outcome of any given decision-making bargaining, or negotiating event (compare Kenkel, 1963:145). In contrast to Olson and Rabunsky's finding that individuals were able to report what decisions were made but not who made them, Sprey asserts that individuals are capable of giving a detailed account of a given argument, but that this is understood and reported in terms of strategy rather than power. He therefore suggests (1972:237) that "we start asking family members to tell us what happens in terms of moves and countermoves, threats and promises, aggression and appeasement, to mention only a few potentially fruitful concepts."

Similarly, Larson (1974:56) comments:

Theory which focuses on the convergence and equilibrium of families toward greater agreement has missed the point. The point would seem better stated as coming to know, understand and feel understood relative to the existence of disagreements...it should not be assumed that the fact of disagreement is inherently a negative feature of family relationships...Once a family, or subsystem within it, becomes aware of disagreements, serious disagreements--those that threaten the stability of the unit--will likely dissipate with time and communication. Other disagreements, however, will provide the cutting edge for change, evolution (nagentropy or morphogenic processes in open systems theory), optimum toleration, and a little dynamic and challenging interaction (eg. bargaining and exchange).

One approach to an analysis of marital conflict resolution as a process is that of Spiegel (1968). He sees interaction within the family from the viewpoint of role analysis. Complementarity of roles within the family system produces equilibrium within the system, whereas

failure of complementarity produces disequilibrium within the system. According to Spiegel (1968:401): "Failure of complementarity is so disrupting that it is almost always accompanied by processes of restoration for which I would like to use the term re-equilibration." Spiegel distinguishes eleven steps in the process of re-equilibration which are seen as having a temporal order, although he is unable to discern the basis of this order. The first five types of conflict management are referred to as role induction, in which the equilibrium is restored by means of a unilateral decision on the part of one of the participants. This resolution is based on manipulative and instrumental procedures. Role induction includes coercion, coaxing, evaluating, masking, and postponement. Role reversal is regarded as a transitional re-equilibrium device which forms a connecting link between the five processes of role induction and role modification. The second five types of conflict management are referred to as role modification, in which re-equilibration is accomplished through changes in attitudes and behaviors of both partners, based on insight and communicative procedures. Role modification includes joking, referral to a third party, exploration for a novel solution, compromise, and consolidation.

While this approach does take into consideration the process of conflict resolution, several weaknesses can be pointed out. First, Spiegel seems to assume that the basic cause of conflict within the family is the breakdown of role complementarity, and that wherever harmony exists role complementarity can be assumed. He asserts (1968:395): "The failure of complementarity feeds back into the awareness of the participants in the form of tension, anxiety or hostility, and self-consciousness. If the process continues without change, it will end in

the disruption of the system." The question of why role complementarity breaks down is answered by reference to cognitive discrepancy, discrepancy of goals, allocative discrepancy, instrumental discrepancy, and discrepancy of cultural value orientations. As Sprey has frequently pointed out, the assumption that equilibrium characterizes the family process and that conflict is an evidence of the breakdown of this process needs to be seriously questioned. Many families do continue despite the existence of perpetual conflict and disorder. Turner (1970:6) asserts: "Occasionally a family marked by incessant conflict turns out to be highly efficient in reaching agreement and getting family activities done. Often a family whose relationships are generally harmonious may nevertheless be incapable of reaching family decisions and getting on with family tasks."

Secondly, the nature of equilibrium is not clearly spelled out by Spiegel, but it does appear to be a rather static state in which no further process of mutual adjustment and change takes place. Thus there seems to be an implicit assumption that change takes place in the family system only through disequilibrium and the resultant re-equilibration process. Equilibrium is not represented as a dynamic changing relationship within the family system, which is a weakness of Spiegel's analysis.

Finally, the concept of temporal order in the resolution of conflict needs to be questioned. Spiegel (1968:402-410) distinguishes eleven steps in the process of the restoration of equilibrium, with these steps having a temporal order which has a kind of internal logic. Though he indicates that he is unable to discern the basis of the order, nevertheless it is assumed. The implicit assumption is that compromise (step number 10) could not take place without passing through the

previous sequence of nine steps. It is doubtful that this sequence of the resolution of conflict can be maintained by empirical research. Each of these steps, must be seen as potential alternative solutions, rather than as a definite sequence having a temporal order.

Turner (1970:6) raises three interrelated questions regarding the way in which the family functions as a social unit. The first question is to what extent the family functions in harmony or conflict, or why there is a difference from family to family in the level of conflict or harmony. The second question is to what extent the family is able to reach decisions and divide up various family tasks or activities. The third question is the tightness or looseness with which individuals who make up the family are bonded together. These three questions set the stage for a more detailed examination of the process of family interaction and family power.

(1) The cybernetic morphogenic model. It is with this orientation in mind that a cybernetic morphogenic model of family interaction is developed in this thesis. This model emphasizes family interaction which takes into account the normative, perceptual, and behavioral domains, but which focuses on the process rather than upon the outcome of family interaction. It is also maintained that the model is capable of handling not only marital interaction, but also interaction within the family as a whole. The model permits us to handle not only cooperation and harmony or relations of equilibrium, but also situations of conflict, and the resultant negotiation processes. The systems approach permits us to integrate further the contributions of some of the major conceptual frameworks in the sociology of the family in a comprehensive application to the actual ongoing process of family interaction.

This model of family interaction is also an implicit recognition that the structural model of family power is never capable of presenting a complete picture because the structure of family power is subject to continuous re-negotiation and reorganization. This means, as Buckley (1967:130) cogently argues:

> ...not only that any given social structure must always fail, to some degree, to define, specify, or provide adequately for some exigencies or unstructured events, but that it will itself positively generate such exigencies: conflicts of interest, ambiguous standards, role discrepancies, and failure to achieve goals.

The morphogenic model does not minimize organization or structure, but rather seeks to recognize that the structure, in order to remain viable, must be subject to elaboration or change. Similarly, Black and Broderick (1972:9) assert that morphogenesis refers not to the way that "individual elements in a model change their values, but rather to a built-in system capacity to change the pattern of relationship between the elements, resulting in an altered sequence of occurrence of system events." It is this built-in capacity to systematically change the sequence of system events which characterizes the morphogenic model of family power. Thus morphogenic processes refer to those processes which change the interaction patterns or the patterns of relationship or role structure within the family. Each interaction sequence has the potential of a morphogenic effect, of which bonding and alienation are examples in the broadest sense.

Black (1972) indicates that treating the family as a cybernetic system results in two major conceptual contributions: the introduction of the principle of feedback mechanisms, and the treatment of the family as an open system, which means that its behavior is influenced by

events and variables outside the family, as well as by the intra-system

feedback loops.

Straus (1972:2) discusses the key problem faced by any researcher

seeking to apply systems theory to the study of the family:

> However, the literature on the application of a systems frame-
> work to the family consists of general discussion of the elements
> of systems theory and its potential. It does not provide specific
> concrete examples of ways of bridging the gap between the very
> abstract formulations of systems theory and the concrete reality of
> the operation of the family.

Straus' paper represents a major step in the bridging of this gap

toward the application of systems theory to the family. One of the key

problems of systems analysis is to isolate the system goals which are

applicable to families in general or to a particular family. For

example, Heer (1963) in his reference to the discrepancy between actual

return and return expected under an alternative to the existing marriage

or family, assumes that both husband and wife conceive of the possibil-

ity of separation, divorce and subsequent remarriage, and that this con-

sideration of alternatives affects the power balance within the marri-

age. In contrast, Sprey (1973:13) argues that since marriage is a

dyadic relationship which is supposed to last, its continuation must be

seen as "an integral part of the 'pay-off' of the 'game of marriage.'

Individual 'wins' or 'losses' in marital negotiation become self-defeat-

ing if they...would impair the survival potential of the relationship

in question." It is quite possible that each of these different per-

spectives may constitute the "system goal" for different families, or

for the same family at different points in time.

As already indicated, this model is not regarded as a sophisti-

cated and finished application of systems theory to the concept of family

power. It is rather the first step in an attempt to apply the findings of previous research in the area of family power, and to apply the further insights provided by the application of the perceptual, normative, and behavioral dimensions of family power. The various elements and operations which enter into a complete treatment of family interaction events are certainly not exhausted by this introductory discusion. Further research and investigation, as well as the initial attempts at application of the system may reveal other key concepts or operations which need to be considered. Furthermore, the present model takes only indirect account of the family as an open system. Further elaboration needs to be given to events and variables which are external to the family, but which have an effect upon family interaction. Such elaboration is outside of the scope of the present approach.

Black and Broderick (1972:26-28) refer to three requirements of a cybernetic model. The first of these is a <u>set of operations</u> or system behaviors to choose from. The model must provide for alternative courses of action. Figure 4 outlines a number of points at which alternative courses of action are possible, that is, decision points (for example, Boxes 3, 4, 5, 36, 14, 17, 20, 24, 27, 29, 30, 32). The second requirement is a set of <u>status indicators</u> which provide information about some aspect of the current conditions of either the system itself or else its environment (for example, Boxes 3, 4, 5, 36, 17, 24, 27, 29, 30, 32). The information provided by status indicators is meaningful only when compared with some corresponding information that is already known or represented within the model, which is referred to as <u>criterion indicators</u>. Criterion indicators allow status indicators to be identified. The criterion indicators utilized in the cybernetic morphogenic model of family

FIGURE 4: CYBERNETIC MORPHOGENIC MODEL OF FAMILY INTERACTION

interaction are perceptual congruence (Box 3), normative congruence (Box 4), behavioral congruence (Box 5), the resolution of conflict(Boxes 17, 24 and 27), equitable action (Box 29), and the existence of alienation (Box 32). According to Black and Broderick (1972:29), when the status indicator does not match the criterion, the next operation is chosen specifically to modify the status indicator in the direction of the criterion. In other words, in cybernetic models the criterion indicators become indicators of system goals.

Figure 4 is a general flow chart of the cybernetic morphogenic model of family interaction developed in this research. This model permits a dynamic analysis of the process of family interaction, rather than considering only the outcome of such interaction. The two major contributions of the model are first, to enable us to differentiate positive, problematic, and negative dyadic or family interaction and, second, to enable us to isolate the level or dimension within which a potential problem of family interaction exists.

The differentiation of positive, problematic, or negative interaction takes place as the result of the choice of various alternative behaviors at different points within the model.

Positive interaction follows the route 1-2-3-4-5-29-6-7. It begins with ego's perception of a need, and the resulting behavior input. If there is perceptual and normative agreement between ego and alter, and if the behavior is congruent with their perception and norms, then the behavior will be executed, will be perceived as equitable, a process of bonding will take place, and the behavioral repertoire will be stored and drawn upon in future interaction. It is anticipated that in well-adjusted families the greatest proportion of interaction will

take this route, that is, there is basic agreement regarding what needs
to be done, and the way in which it ought to be done. This route may
also account for habitual or non-problematical interaction, that is
routine action. Since there is really no question regarding perceptual
or normative standards, or regarding the congruence or equitable nature
of the behavior itself, it passes without being questioned. This route
then represents cooperative or harmonious interaction.

Problematical interaction takes account of the fact that there
are issues to be resolved and disagreements to be settled in all fam-
ilies. This is in keeping with Sprey's contention that the family needs
to be seen as a system in conflict, that is, a situation in which har-
mony and stability are to be seen as problematical rather than normal
states of affairs.

Problematical interaction results from either perceptual dis-
agreement (1-2-3-12-36...), normative disagreement (1-2-3-4-12-36...),
or the lack of congruence of behavior with perception or norms (1-2-3-
4-5-12-36...). The lack of perceptual, normative, or behavioral con-
gruity results in discrepant behavior, that is, in behavior by either
ego or alter which does not agree with what is expected by the other
person, given their perceptual, normative, or behavioral input. Discrep-
ant behavior should be regarded as a descriptive rather than an analytical
element of the systems approach to family interaction. Such behavior
arises out of or reflects incongruent perceptions, norms, or behaviors.

Discrepant behavior, however, does not necessarily lead to be-
havior conflict. It may not be noticed by the other person or, if
noticed, it may be allowed to pass without being challenged. If dis-
crepant behavior is not challenged, we proceed to the next indicator

which asks if the action is perceived as equitable. If the discrepant behavior is challenged, the result is behavior conflict which then proceeds to the process of negotiation. The results of this negotiation may take one of several alternative routes which will be spelled out in greater detail at a later point.

There are two senses in which interaction is defined as problematical. First, discrepant behavior may or may not be challenged, with different possible outcomes in each case. If challenged, discrepant behavior will result in behavior conflict. Second, and more important, is the fact that behavior conflict may be resolved, in which case the result would be a positive outcome. On the other hand, behavior conflict may not be resolved, in which case the outcome would be negative. Because the interaction determines the positive or negative outcome, such interaction is defined as problematical. In view of the modern emphasis on egalitarian relations, and the lack of normative guidelines for such relations, it is to be expected that a considerable proportion of family interaction will be problematical in nature. It is impossible to predict the outcome of such interaction with any major degree or measure of certainty.

Negative interaction would characterize those families which are usually defined as maladjusted or pathological. Interaction sequences would tend to follow the route ...-17-26-27-25-32-28-7. In other words, these families have not learned how to handle conflict, with the result that their entire interaction tends to be dominated by conflict.

This differentiation of alternative family behaviors can then be very easily utilized in providing a taxonomy of family adjustment and ability to handle conflict.

A further contribution of the model is to enable us to isolate the level or dimension within which a potential problem of family interaction exists. One of the implicit assumptions of the model and, indeed, of the conceptual orientation, is that problems of interaction exist in either the perceptual, the normative, or the behavioral dimension, or in some combination of dimensions. Three levels of congruence between perceptions, norms, and behavior have been isolated earlier (Table 2). These levels of congruence can be applied in determining the level or dimension within which the potential problem of interaction may be found. The ability to determine whether conflict takes place at the intrapersonal level, the interpersonal level, or the interpersonal-interdimensional level should be extremely valuable both to a therapist dealing with family problems and to the general student of the family who is seeking a more accurate understanding of family interaction process. This would suggest the dimension in which potential modification needs to take place in order to bring about optimum resolution of the conflict.

Having provided a general overview of the functioning of the systems model, it now becomes possible to examine each of the elements in greater detail, and to give concrete examples of how it would function in delineating family interaction.

(2) The process of family interaction. The initial stages of any interaction event reveal the strong influence of the approach of symbolic interaction. Ego perceives some need or situation to which he makes some behavioral response which may vary from facial expression to some verbal response. This behavioral input is defined in the broad sense of any behavior which can be assigned some meaning by the actor

or observer (Turner, 1970:21). Alter receives ego's behavioral input, places his own interpretation on it, and responds on the basis of this interpretation. The further style and content of the interaction sequence depends on this interpretation and response. At this stage in the interaction cycle the first three status indicators are applied to determine if the criteria are being met. In order to provide a practical example, case description number 12 from the Inventory of Marital Conflicts (Olson, 1970a) will be utilized. The case description is as follows:

> Each night Larry promises Judy that he will throw the garbage out after they finish dinner. Invariably, Larry forgets and leaves the kitchen without doing what he has promised. Judy has felt that the best thing to do is to throw the garbage away by herself and has been doing this later in the evening. When he notices this, Larry becomes angry with Judy, stating that this is his job. As Larry continues to follow his old habits, Judy begins to do the chore herself, only to be angrily criticized by her husband.

The application of the status indicators may take place at any one of the levels of congruence. On the first level of intrapersonal congruence, the lack of congruence is first evident between the perception and norms of Larry and his behavior, that is, his behavior is not congruent with his perception and norms. Various psychological problems could be advanced to account for this lack of congruence. Similarly, in response to Larry's behavior, Judy's carrying out the garbage also leads to behavior which is not congruent with her perception and norms. Since the present model is concerned with interaction, the lack of intrapersonal congruence will not be pursued any further.

The application of the status indicators at the second level reveals that there is congruence between the perceptions of ego and the perceptions of alter, between the norms of ego and the norms of alter,

as well as between the behavior of ego and the behavior of alter. A question may be raised regarding the behavioral congruence of ego and alter. Since ego is not taking out the garbage, this job is done by alter and hence the lack of congruence does not exist at this level.

It is at the third level of interpersonal-interdimensional congruence that problems of interaction become evident. Although a lack of intrapersonal congruence was noted between the behavior and the norms and perceptions of ego, this does not necessarily lead to interpersonal conflict. Despite perceptual and normative agreement regarding how the garbage should be handled, Larry's persistent failure to take out the garbage indicates that his behavior is not only incongruent with his perceptions and norms, but with Judy's perceptions and norms as well. Similarly, Judy's behavior of taking out the garbage is incongruent not only with her own perceptions and norms, but with the perception and norms of Larry. The result of this lack of congruence is discrepant behavior, which leads to behavior conflict. Had Larry carried out the garbage, his behavior would have been congruent, and the behavior sequence would have continued through to the exit.

The lack of congruence of Larry's behavior on the interpersonal-interdimensional level leads to discrepant behavior (Larry's failure to take out the garbage), and the resulting behavior conflict. The resolution of the behavior conflict must come about through a process of negotiation. It is at this point that the insights of exchange theory (Homans, 1961; Blau, 1964; Turner, 1970) become relevant. Turner (1970: 106) suggests that the term bargaining may seem inappropriate as a description of the deliberations of members in the intimate family relationship. He suggests that "bargaining is simply a general term

for any interaction in which the concessions that one member makes to another are expected to be reciprocated in some manner, so that over the long run the sacrifices of each will balance out." Turner suggests three characteristics of the family bargaining process: (1) it is implicit (it is understood but not explicitly expressed); (2) it is quantitatively approximate (it is difficult to spell out in quantitative terms how a particular concession is to be reciprocated); and (3) it is based on the general confidence of members in the fairness of others (this is encouraged by the fact that being generous is a way of establishing the expectation of generous treatment when the current winner may be the loser, and by the fact that a bargaining relationship rests on trust and being generous is a way of inviting and offering trust so that the relationship can proceed with confidence).

(3) Negotiation. The process of negotiation may take the form of either influence or coercion (force). As already indicated in the discussion of these terms in connection with the structural model, influence and coercion should not be regarded as discrete categories, but rather as falling on a continuum in the process of bargaining or negotiation. Bales and Strodtbeck (1951) refer to three successive phases of group problem solving--orientation, evaluation, and control. Turner (1970:103) suggests that in the case of recurring family issues, the phases of orientation and evaluation have largely taken place in the past, with the result that there is a disproportionate emphasis on the control phase. In other words, the attempts at influence or coercion are central in an understanding of the process of negotiation within the family.

Turner (1970:97) differentiates between task-oriented group

activity which is defined as decision-making, and identity-oriented
group activity which is referred to as conflict. Conflict is rather
narrowly defined as a "relationship in which the participants are
attempting to improve or protect their own self-images by damaging the
identities of the others" (1970:137), and hence the cause of conflict
is seen as the circumstances leading to ego's perception of the identity
of alter as a threat to his own identity. Conflict is further compared
to "a child's seesaw, with the identities of ego and alter on the two
ends. Whenever one identity is enhanced, the other is damaged; what-
ever lowers one identity raises the other" (1970:135). Sprey (1971:727)
takes issue with the conception of marital conflict as a situation in
which winning by one partner entails losing by the other. He argues
instead for a non-zero sum game conception of conflict in which both
parties can either win or lose. This follows from his definition of
family process as a "continuous confrontation between participants with
conflicting--though not necessarily opposing--interests in their shared
fate" (1971:722). The focus of this approach is on the ways in which
family members negotiate the issues that arise from their joint partici-
pation in the institutions of marriage and the family. It is Sprey's
view of conflict, and the resultant bargaining and negotiation, which
is adopted in this thesis.

Safilios-Rothschild (1970:540) defines influence as the degree to
which formal or informal, overt or covert pressure as exerted by one
family member is successful in imposing that member's wishes, despite
initial opposition. She concludes that there may be two different types
of influence power, with each type being obtained by different means.

The one type of influence power, that we could call "verbal"

influence power, is obtained by means of persuasive verbal tech-
niques and can take place only when the "influencer" as well as
the "influenced" party are quite near in terms of enjoyed power.
Two "equals" (although the word here is not used in its absolute
sense) openly try to convince each other, or the one tries to
persuade the other.

The other type of influence power, the "nonverbal" influence
power, is obtained by means of emotional, sexual influence tech-
niques and seems to be the only type of influence that can be
employed when the "influencer" is quite far apart from the "influ-
enced" party in terms of power possession....Thus, the wife has
only access to the typical "feminine" weapons, weapons of the
weak that is, crying, sulking or, on the contrary, "buttering the
husband up" by preparing favorite foods, by being extra sweet and
affectionate in order to render him in a good mood and, therefore,
more responsive to her wishes and desires (Safilios-Rothschild,
1972b:9,10).

Several comments can be made concerning the above conclusions.

First, it is an open question whether males or females are more adept

in the use of verbal techniques. Secondly, men have not been unknown

to use the "silent treatment" or techniques of withdrawal in situations

of conflict. Thirdly, the process of "buttering the wife up" by bring-

ing home flowers or candy, or buying her a new fur coat, or compliment-

ing her on her cooking or her appearance are not entirely unknown male

strategies. Such strategies of bargaining can be used by either partic-

ipant, as well as in parent-child or child-parent influence attempts.

The systems model does permit the observation of these bargaining strat-

egies, and further testing of related hypotheses is therefore possible.

As already indicated in the discussion of the structural model,

coercion or the use of physical force falls at the more intense end of

the negotiation continuum. The use of coercion tends to bring negotia-

tion to an end, since a solution is forced upon the weaker participant.

Turner (1970:106) indicates that coercion leads to unwilling agreement,

and that commitment to such agreement can take place only with the con-

tinued use of coercive power.

Straus (1972:4) finds that a correlation of power and violence reveals that "the higher the husband's power, the less often wives used physical force (throwing things, hitting, kicking, pushing, etc.). However, the use of physical force by the husband tends to be high at both the wife-predominant and the husband-predominant ends of the continuum."

Sprey (1973:12) refers to the use of threats as one of the key concepts in the negotiation process, but indicates that this concept has not been used in an analysis of family conflict. Threat is defined as "a message--verbal or nonverbal--which indicates unfavorable consequences, for all concerned, resulting from failure to comply with its demand. It may be implicit or explicit. To be effective, however, it needs to be understood by both its sender and receiver" (Sprey, 1971: 726). Sprey further points out that much of the social science literature on the use of threats in conflict situations (Deutsch and Krauss, 1960; Tedeschi, 1970) ignores two aspects of the situation which are crucial in the process of family conflict. First, in this literature, threat is usually defined unilaterally, thus ignoring the fact that threats may have some important consequences for the sender as well as for the receiver, with the result that both parties may win or lose, depending on the receiver's response to the threat. Secondly, this literature overlooks the fact that the receiver may be aware of the consequences of the threat to both parties, and his reaction is determined accordingly, rather than being simply a reaction to the threat itself. It is apparent that the use of threat is a key concept both in the analysis of influence attempts, as well as in the analysis of coercion (Goode, 1971).

Various other interaction techniques may be utilized in the process

of negotiation. The use of promises as the opposite of threats has not

been systematically examined in the interaction process. Similarly, some

of the re-equilibration processes mentioned by Spiegel (1968) should be

examined for their applicability to the negotiation process. The rele-

vance of such concepts as coaxing, evaluating, masking, role-reversal,

joking, and exploring (Spiegel, 1968) are immediately apparent in any

consideration of family negotiation. A more complete outline of nego-

tiation strategies will be developed from the systematic observation

and study of families as they are engaged in the process of negotiation.

This needs to be established as one of the goals of further research in

this area.

A further consideration of the negotiating process is the con-

tinued influence of the perceptual and normative dimensions upon the

behavior of the participants during the process of negotiation. The

very nature of the negotiation process depends heavily upon the percep-

tual dimension. Ego puts himself in the place of the other persons in

the situations, constantly checks the effect of his action on them, and

adjusts and readjusts his action on the basis of his perception of their

response. The same kind of behavioral adjustment in response to the

perceptual clues takes place for each participant. The normative

dimension also has a crucial influence in the process of bargaining and

negotiation. An example of such normative control of the process of

negotiation is given by Straus (1972:12,13):

> One of the problems was that the husband frequently hit the wife.
> The husband agreed that this was wrong but said that it occurred
> in situations where he lost control and could not stop. The marri-
> age counselor then asked: "Why don't you stab her?" This possibil-
> ity (and the fact that the husband did not stab the wife; despite
> "losing control") clearly shows that his hitting the wife was not
> simply a reversion to primitive levels of behavior but, in fact,

was under normative control. The implicit, unrecognized, but none the less operating norms for this husband enabled him to hit his wife, but not to stab her.

The process of negotiation terminates in the application of the fourth status indicator which asks the question whether the conflict has been resolved. If the negotiation has not resulted in a resolution of the conflict, the result may be described as a stalemate (Box 26). The realization by the participants that a stalemate has been reached may lead to the execution of corrective responses, which results in further negotiation. This cycle may be repeated a number of times before the conflict is ultimately resolved.

(4) Resolution of conflict. If the conflict is resolved, this resolution will take place as the result of perceptual, normative, or behavioral modifications. Such modifications or changes represent the operation of the process of morphogenesis, or the "built-in system capacity to change the pattern of relationship between the elements, resulting in an altered sequence of occurrence of system events" (Black and Broderick, 1972:9). This represents an elaboration or change in the structure of family interaction, and is an indication of why the static model is an inadequate representation of family interaction.

Regardless of whether the conflict has its origin in the perceptual, normative, or behavioral domains, the resolution may come about as the result of modification within any one of these dimensions. Using our previous example of Larry and Judy, and the problem of carrying out the garbage, it was concluded that the problem originated in the behavioral dimension--Larry's persistent failure to carry out the garbage despite the feeling that this was his job.

Resolution of the conflict may take place as the result of

perceptual modification (Box 18). Since Larry apparently perceives that he is threatened when Judy takes out the garbage, the process of bargaining or negotiation may convince Larry that Judy really does not mind taking out the garbage and that, in fact, she does it because she is concerned that he is working too hard, and facing many pressures as the result of his new job, which helps to account for his forgetfulness of this task. The discussion results in a changed perception of the situation, and the modified perception then feeds back to the indicator of perceptual agreement (Box 3). Since the modified perceptions have now resulted in perceptual agreement, we can proceed to the next indicator of normative agreement.

As the problem was originally stated in the case description there was normative agreement regarding the task of garbage disposal. On this basis we would move to the behavioral indicator. However, if on the basis of the above negotiation process, both Larry and Judy perceived Judy's taking out the garbage as acceptable behavior, this would require some normative adjustment (Box 19) to bring the norms into agreement with the new perceptions. This could take place in several different ways: they could agree that the arrangement was only temporary, and when the pressure at work was relieved Larry would resume his responsibility; they could agree that in place of taking out the garbage, Larry could do another task; or they could conclude that taking out the garbage was still Larry's job, but that it would be stored in the basement until Saturday when Larry would have more time to take it out. Whatever modification takes place with reference to norms has to feed back into the status indicator regarding normative agreement.

Resolution of the conflict may finally take place as the result of behavioral modification (Box 20). As originally stated, the problem developed because of Larry's failure to take out the garbage. It was his behavior which led to the conflict. Behavioral modification may take place in one of three ways: (1) An alternative solution may be found (Box 21). Both Larry and Judy may decide that their twelve-year-old son should really assume more responsibility around the house, and that this would be his responsibility from now on. (This solution may resolve the conflict between Larry and Judy, but it may result in unexpected conflict between the parents and their son, thus revealing the dynamic nature of family interaction.) (2) It may take the form of modification or compromise (Box 22). In exchange for Judy's taking out the garbage, Larry agrees to do some other task; or storing the garbage in the basement until the weekend also represents a compromise as does the agreement that Larry will resume his responsibility once the pressure at work begins to subside. Many other possible modifications or compromises could be suggested. (3) Capitulation (Box 23) could take place. After the bargaining session Larry responds by regularly taking out the garbage. Of course, if new norms were adopted and agreed on in a previous bargaining session, then both partner's behavior would need to conform to these new norms. Once the behavioral modification is agreed on, the status indicator regarding the resolution of conflict is once again applied. If the behavioral modification does resolve the conflict, it feeds back into the behavioral indicator to determine if the new behavior is congruent. This process may feed through the system several times during one episode of conflict, with various changes being made in the perceptual, normative, or behavioral dimensions, or

in any combination of these dimensions. On the other hand, the behavioral modification may not result in a resolution of the conflict. There is no further effort to reach a resolution, with a resulting postponement (24-25...).

Similarly, the process of bargaining may not result in a resolution of the conflict, or in any perceptual, normative or behavioral modification with a resulting stalemate (Box 26), in which neither participant is willing to relinquish his position. Thus, for example, in the case of Larry and Judy, Judy continued to take out the garbage when Larry failed to do so, and Larry continued to insist that this was his job. If corrective responses are executed, they then feed back into the process of bargaining and negotiation. On the other hand, if corrective responses are not available, or if available responses are not executed, the stalemate will issue in a postponement of the issue.

(5) Postponement. Spiegel (1968:407) defines postponement as an induction technique which is based on the expectation in both ego and alter that the other will change his mind as a result of the postponement. He asserts: "Most role conflicts in the family are not settled at the moment, but are deferred and taken up afresh, time and time again." This assertion regarding the postponement of issues is supported by Weick (1971:11,12), who refers to the predominance of unfinished business within the family, that is, at any particular moment, the family as a group contains more unsolved problems than exist in non-family groups. The attempt to solve a particular problem within the family frequently involves the consideration of a backlog of problems that were discussed earlier, but which were never successfully resolved. In other words, the consideration of a problem at Time 2 may

be seriously affected by the fact that this problem has been postponed
at Time 1. This situation is accentuated by several other factors:

> Members differ considerably in their criteria as to what constitutes
> an adequate solution, the consequences of any solution typically are
> less concrete and occur with more gradualness than is typical in the
> non-family group, the consequences of the solution do not have equal
> impact on all members, and by the time the consequences have
> occurred and are reported to other members, these consequences may
> have been filtered and modified in content due to their differen-
> tial impact (Weick, 1971:11,12).

The postponement of decisions or of conflict resolution may or
may not lead to the process of alienation between the participants or
to the escalation of the conflict. Whether postponement leads to
alienation depends on the nature of the issue (that is, its seriousness
or importance to the participants), the previous history of the partici-
pants with reference to the same or similar issues, the physiological
state of the participants (fatigued, hungry, ill or emotionally upset),
and many other possible factors. When postponement takes place, the
status indicator of whether alienation results must be applied. In
some cases postponement may prevent alienation in that it gives each
participant an opportunity to reflect on his feelings and basic needs,
and to work through such confused thoughts and feelings. On the other
hand, if postponement is regarded as an escape mechanism by one of the
participants, or as an attempt to dodge the necessity of making a deci-
sion, it is likely that alienation would result. The existence of a
backlog of unfinished business or postponed decisions may help to
account for the fact that serious conflict may erupt within the family
over issues which seem insignificant or meaningless to outsiders
(Scanzoni, 1971). Such insignificant issues, however, may simply repre-
sent the proverbial "straw that broke the camel's back."

(6) <u>Bonding</u>. The concept of bonding is at least partially the contribution of various ethological studies (Lorenz, 1969: Tinbergen, 1965, 1968), and has been applied to human interaction by Nisbett, Simmel, and Tiger (Sprey, 1971). Turner (1970) has provided an extensive treatment of the concept of bonding in its application to the family. Because of the lack of attention to this concept among family sociologists, the present formulation must be regarded as a preliminary statement, subject to review and revision.

Turner sees bonds coming into existence "when some <u>value</u> of the individual's--shared or unique--is felt to be fostered by association and interaction with some other person or group" (1970:41). The existence of any group is explained by the concept of bonds which bring the members together, which keep them together, and which cause them to interact within the group.

Turner (1970:42-47) points out several important facts regarding the nature of bonds. First, a distinction is made between the nature and strength of bonds and the processes of conflict and harmony. A high degree of bondedness or interdependence does not necessarily lead to a harmonious relationship, nor does minimal interdependence necessarily indicate conflict. In fact, conflict does not take place unless there is a high degree of interdependence to keep the antagonistic individuals interacting. The absence of bonds would result in indifference or avoidance. Secondly, bonding must be regarded as a continuous process, with bonds being subject to constant change from courtship to marriage to established family relationships. Thirdly, bonds vary in their level of discrimination, with some bonds being very specific whereas others are very general. Fourthly, although bonds are selective, the

choice is always relative to an available range of alternatives.
Fifthly, a distinction is made between love and family bonds. Love is
regarded as reflecting the presence of family bonds more than it is a
bond in itself, with the result that love endures or declines because
bonds remain effective or become ineffective.

Turner makes an important distinction between task bonds and
person bonds. Three factors contribute to the formation of task bonds:
successful collaboration leads to the anticipation of collaborating in
the future; sustained interaction or collaboration provides the setting
in which other bonds can be formed; and, the experience of shared enjoy-
ment has a residual bonding effect (Turner, 1970:55,56). The two prin-
ciples of mutual gratification and economy of decision are used to
explain interpersonal selectivity in the formulation and maintenance of
task bonds. The principle of mutual gratification asserts that "the
strength of the task-based bonds in any family is a function of the
ratio of activities that serve the members' mutual ends to the activi-
ties that serve the ends of only some of the members" (Turner, 1970:61).
The principle of economy of decision asserts that "the more easily two
people can reach decisions, the greater the opportunity to form bonds
on the basis of...collaboration" (1970:62).

Person bonds or identity bonds, in contrast to task bonds, are
formed through the identity-oriented aspects of social interaction
rather than through task accomplishment. In other words, family mem-
bers are linked together as persons, rather than through the more
impersonal task bonds. An identity bond is established "whenever the
identity gratification is perceived to come from association or inter-
action with some other person" (1970:65). Such association or

interaction may generate an identity bond through the relationship of
identification, in which ego "assimilates into his own self-conception
the qualities which he perceives in alter's identity," with a resulting
enhancement of ego's self-conception. An identity bond may also be
generated through the nature of alter's response to ego (for example,
deference, trust, appreciation, etc.), with a resulting enhancement of
ego's self-conception.

The distinction between task-bonds and person-bonds leads Turner
to make a distinction between decision-making processes and the processes
of conflict and harmony. Decision-making is regarded as central to the
accomplishment of group tasks, and is defined as "a process directed
toward unambivalent group assent and commitment to a course of action
or inaction" (1970:97). In contrast, the process of conflict and har-
mony is central to the relationship among identities.

> If conflict is a relationship in which the participants are
> attempting to improve or protect their own self-images by damaging
> the identities of the others, the immediate cause must lie in
> circumstances leading ego to perceive the identity of alter as a
> threat to his own identity. In response to such a perception ego
> issues a gesture that disparages alter's identity. If alter
> replies by attacking ego's identity, or responds defensively so as
> to require that ego apologize or withdraw his gesture (which he can
> seldom do without some damage to his identity), the conflict is
> then fully initiated. (Turner, 1970:137-8).

Based on Coser's differentiation between "realistic" and "non-
realistic" conflict, Scanzoni (1972) makes a similar distinction between
personality (identity-oriented conflict) and situational conflict (task-
oriented conflict). Realistic conflict is regarded as emerging from and
as being directed toward the structure of situations. It is directed
toward such questions as whether or not the wife should work, how the
weekly paycheck should be spent, and similar decisions (that is, task-

oriented decisions). In contrast, nonrealistic conflict is based on personality rather than on situational inequities or problems. It is due to the <u>need</u> of the person (husband or wife) to express certain inner feelings. "Because of particular personality characteristics, certain persons periodically engage in hostilities, antagonisms, and conflicts that are clearly not directed towards specific situations or desired changes in role relationships" (Scanzoni, 1972:77). The distinction is regarded as important in that many therapists tend to treat all conflict as emerging from personality maladjustment rather than from the details of the situation.

The present model of family interaction does not differentiate between task-oriented problems and identity-oriented problems or between situational and personality conflicts and, indeed, regards such differentiation as unnecessary. Both task-oriented conflict as well as identity-oriented conflict is brought about by a lack of congruence of either perceptions, norms, or behaviors, and the resulting discrepant behavior brings about behavior conflict which is subject to resolution through the process of negotiation. Even Turner (1970:97) recognizes that what he calls the decision-making processes and the conflict and harmonization processes are never separate in real life, and that the patterns of decision-making have effects on conflict and harmony, and vice versa. Rather than seeking to determine if the conflict is brought about by task-oriented behavior or by identity-oriented behavior, it is more important to focus on the process of interaction and the means by which a resolution of both kinds of conflict can be brought about.

Sprey (1971) takes issue with the view that bonds simply establish and maintain stable patterns of human interaction, tying individuals

together in a wide range of relationships, and keeping most people in their assigned positions. He argues that such a conceptualization of bonding does not take sufficient account of the synthetic nature of bonding, that is, the changes which are brought about in two people as a result of the fact that they are "tied" together by some bond. According to Sprey (1971:723), the concept of bonding "must grasp the interdependence between the nature of the bond and the participatory quality of those through whose membership it is actualized. In other words, it should contain the synthesis which is the essence of each reciprocal human relationship."

Accordingly, the nature of the bond is determined by the nature of the interaction of the individuals who are bound together by this bond. It is this insight which is grasped by the cybernetic morphogenic model of family interaction, which takes account of the fact that the nature of interaction (positive, problematic, or negative) determines the nature of the bond and, conversely, the nature of the bond affects the quality and style of further interaction.

Sprey (1971:724) further argues that an understanding of a bond requires an understanding of that which remains outside the bond. A bond is regarded as paradoxical in nature in that the closer we move toward another person, the more we confront and become aware of the uniqueness or the "difference" of the other person. Any attempt to remove this difference or to "become one" would ultimately mean the end of reciprocity.

> It is this paradox, this synthesis between nearness and remoteness in every relationship that provides the clue to our analysis of the management of conflict in bonds. The closer the bond, the more exclusive of strangers it becomes, the greater is also its vulnerability and its strength. Its strength is a consequence of

its vulnerability, that is, the strain resulting from the inability of its members to be indifferent to one another (Sprey, 1971:724).

A substantial body of literature (see Hicks and Platt, 1971 for an extended review) indicates that there is a gradual decrease in marital happiness or satisfaction over the family life cycle, which is conceptualized by Pineo (1961) as a process of disenchantment. The present model of family interaction provides an explanation of this decrease with the assumption that over time, an increasing number of conflicts are not resolved within the family, thus contributing to the process of alienation.

Reference has already been made to the ability of the model to differentiate positive, problematic, and negative interaction within the family system. This differentiation takes place as the result of the choice of various alternative behaviors at different points within the model.

A question which requires further research and conceptual clarification is the relationship between conflict and the stability of the family. It is necessary to account for the fact that "relationships with relatively little conflict are sometimes broken by divorce, by a child leaving the family, or by brother and sister going their totally separate ways, and that families with abundant conflict continue unbroken" (Turner, 1970:6).

Sprey (1969:699) makes the following comments on this apparent paradox:

> Oscar Lewis' recent book, La Vida, for example, provides a chronicle of continuing familial disharmony and disorganization. Other studies furnish similar data. How then can we explain the fact that many disorganized and conflict-ridden families do not disintegrate? How is the perpetuation of family disorder from generation to generation to be understood? How do so many of the so-called

"multi-problem" families stubbornly continue their existence--in one form or another--while accumulating every conceivable problem along the way?

The cybernetic morphogenic model of family interaction provides several possible explanations for questions and findings such as those raised by Sprey and Turner.

(7) Equity. An important key to understanding the level of stability or disorganization within a family is the perception by participants that family action is equitable (Box 29). This then becomes one of the goals toward which the system of interaction moves. The concept of equity is suggested in Turner's definition of bargaining as "any interaction in which the concessions that one member makes to another are expected to be reciprocated in some manner, so that over the long run the sacrifices of each will balance out" (Turner, 1970: 106). Turner cites results from empirical studies on bargaining in social interaction which indicate that bargaining is normally tempered by a concern with equity. He points out two features of bargaining which lead to this concern for equity when continuing relationships with the same person are anticipated (Turner, 1970:107): (1) Being generous in the bargaining process leads to the establishment of an expectation of generous treatment at some later point when the current winner may be the loser. (2) Since a bargaining relationship rests on trust, being generous is one way of inviting and offering trust, thereby providing assurance that the relationship can proceed with confidence. Piaget (1932:284) finds that the concept of equity is a mark of a higher stage of morality or concern with justice which passes from a rigid and inflexible notion of right and wrong which is learned from parents, to a sense of equity which takes into account the specific situation.

It may be possible that a particular action or gesture may be perceptually, normatively, and behaviorally congruent, and still be perceived as inequitable by one of the participants. For example, an adolescent son who has received previous permission to use his parents' car for an important date, may perceive it as inequitable when his father preempts the car for an unexpected but very important business engagement. There is perceptual, normative, and behavioral agreement that the father should use the car, but the action is still perceived as inequitable. Such perceived inequity, however, is the result of the violation of a prior agreement. Perceived inequity may also take place without such violation. In the example of Larry and Judy, there was perceptual and normative agreement regarding who should take out the garbage. Larry felt strongly that this was his job. If we assume that the results of the negotiation process led to behavioral modification, with the result that Larry consistently carried out the garbage after this agreement, then there would be perceptual, normative, and behavioral congruence. It is possible that such congruence is only superficial, and thus represents artificial compliance to a series of expectations. It may be that Larry really feels that he is doing far too many household tasks and that carrying out the garbage, though insignificant by itself, is only another indication of a more general perceived inequity in the marital relationship. Actions which are perceived as inequitable may either feed back into the system in the process of negotiation (Box 14), or, if corrective responses are not executed they may result in residual inequity. Within a marital relationship there may be any number of minor issues which are not regarded as being serious enough to warrant a disagreement or unpleasant scene.

These issues remain under the surface, and may never cause a serious problem. However, they are present within the relationship, and have been categorized as residual inequity. Residual inequity is defined as those issues which are perceived by one of the interactants as being inequitable, but not serious enough to warrant a disagreement. Much residual inequity simply exits through the system without creating any strong feelings of alienation (29-30-31-32-7). In Turner's terms, an inequitable situation is accepted without hard feelings and without alienation, because it is expected that the concessions will be recip- rocated in some manner at some later time, so that over the long run the sacrificies will balance out. If, on the other hand, the inequities become systematic and apparent (if one participant must consistently "give in"), such inequity will tend to lead to alienation (31-32-28).

The development of residual inequity is strongly affected by Thibaut and Kelley's notion of comparison level. Comparison level is defined as "some modal or average value of all the outcomes known to the person (by virtue of personal or vicarious experience), each out- come weighted by its salience (or the degree to which it is instigated for the person at the moment)" (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959:81). The higher any outcome is above the comparison level, the more satisfying it is; the lower an outcome is below the comparison level, the less satisfying it is. A person's comparison level will be determined by his own experiences and expectations. A moderate amount of residual inequity may be devastating for a person with a low comparison level. On the other hand, a person with a high comparison level may perceive little threat even with relatively high levels of residual inequity.

(8) Alienation. The process of alienation is rather difficult

to define in that most discussions approach the subject on an intra-personal or psychological level. In the present analysis, alienation is seen as the result of interaction process, and is simply defined as a feeling of estrangement between two or more interacting individuals.

The process of alienation can only be fully understood as it is seen in relation to the process of bonding. A basic assumption of the present approach is that an increase in bonding will lead to a decrease in alienation and an increase in alienation will lead to a decrease in bonding. This assumption is a basic requirement of the systems model in that, as the proportion of interaction which takes the route (1-2-3-4-5-29-6-7) increases, the process of bonding increases and the process of alienation decreases. On the other hand, as the proportion of interaction which takes the route (...26-27-25-32-28-7) increases, there will be a resulting increase in alienation and decrease in bonding. This relationship always remains a dynamic relationship, with the result that the level of bonding or of alienation within the family at a particular time will always be a function of the interaction patterns which are in the process of development.

As Figure 4 illustrates, alienation is operationally conceived as arising from either residual inequity or from postponed decisions. In either case, alienation may be the result of one serious case of perceived inequity or postponed decisions, or it may be the result of the accumulation of a large number of minor issues. Just as residual inequity is affected by the external variable of comparison level, so alienation is affected by the two external variables of commitment and comparison level for alternatives. It needs to be recognized that the process of alienation is subject to the interaction sequences within

the marriage or family. In contrast, Waller and Hill's (1951:513) definition of alienation seems to suggest that once the process has begun it leads invariably to family dissolution:

> It rests upon crises after each of which the relationship is re-defined upon a level of greater alienation and greater instability; these crises are interlarded, usually, with periodic reconcilia-tions and periods in which the couple make a determined attempt to adjust to life with one another. Alienation is a summatory social process; like mating, it is a process in which each response leads to the next in line and the motive for each new step is furnished by the experiences of the process up to that point.

One of the variables affecting the alienation level of any fam-ily system is that of commitment. The concept of commitment is typi-cally used, according to Becker (1960:33), when "trying to account for the fact that people engage in consistent lines of activity." Becker suggests that commitment is derived from a side bet, which directly involves in a particular action some interests which were originally extraneous to that action. The major elements of commitment are:

> First, the individual is in a position in which his decision with regard to some particular line of action has consequences for other interests and activities not necessarily related to it. Second, he has placed himself in that position by his own prior actions. A third element is present, though so obvious as not to be apparent: the committed person must be aware that he has made the side bet and must recognize that his decision in this case will have ramifications beyond it (Becker, 1960:35-36).

Becker suggests that a person may sometimes find that he has made side bets constraining his present activity because the existence of generalized cultural expectations provides penalties for those who violate them. This would be supported by the finding that as divorce has been increasingly sanctioned, the incidence of divorce has increased. This is further supported by Johnson's (1973:397) comment regarding the nature of social commitment: "when an actor initiates a line of action and other people are aware of his behavior, they may form normative

expectations concerning its continuation." He concludes that "the social commitment felt by the actor would be a function of such things as his awareness of the expectations, the characteristics of his relationship with those who hold the expectations, and the perceived legitimacy of the expectations" (Johnson, 1973:397).

Hobart (1963) argues that the loss of family functions, increased personal mobility, a decline in status ascription and an increase in status achievement, and the ascendency of materialistic values has tended to weaken the solidarity of the family. In order to bring about a change, success values need to be displaced by the more human-oriented being, knowing, caring, loving values. "A key to this value change lies in renewed commitment to the family and in thus re-establishing the centrality of the commitment to inefficient, human values which the family relationship symbolizes" (Hobart, 1963:410).

It appears that the general cultural expectations regarding the continuance of the family relationship are weakening. One of the variables which may help to account for the continuance of a marital or family relationship in situations of conflict is what Johnson (1973:395) refers to as "personal commitment" or strong personal dedication to carry out a line of action despite the growing absence of what Becker has referred to as side bets.

Another external variable affecting the outcome of increased levels of alienation is what Thibaut and Kelley (1959) have referred to as "comparison level for alternatives." These are defined as "the lowest level of outcomes a member will accept in the light of available alternative opportunities" (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959:21). The comparison level for alternatives is also weighted by the salience of the

possible outcomes, with the result that unlikely outcomes in the alternative relationship will have little weight, since they are regarded as having little possibility of coming to pass. The comparison level for alternatives is the lowest level of reward which the individual will accept in order to remain in the relationship. When this point is passed, the individual will choose the alternative relationship. The wife who has a good career and feels relatively independent may choose to live alone rather than to remain in an unsatisfactory relationship. Similarly, a wife who perceives her chances of securing another partner to be high would be less likely to remain in a highly unsatisfactory relationship than if she could see no viable alternatives to the present relationship. An individual who is unable to perceive alternatives to the present relationship will tend to remain in the relationship, no matter how high the level of conflict may be in the present relationship.

A further relationship needs to be seen between commitment and comparison level for alternatives. A high level of commitment would be associated with a high comparison level for alternatives. A low level of commitment would be associated with a low comparison level for alternatives. The comparison level for alternatives against which the process of alienation is measured will be different for each marital dyad or family group, and will also vary within the same group from time to time. When the process of alienation has reached the comparison level for alternatives for one or both of the participants, family dissolution is likely to result.

(9) <u>Family stability</u>. It is now possible to return to the question of why some families with relatively little conflict are broken by divorce or separation whereas other families with abundant conflict do

not disintegrate. The family with little conflict may not have learned how to handle conflict (that is, the process of negotiation fails to bring about a resolution), and the majority of conflict issues result in a stalemate or postponement. As the amount of unfinished business within the family accumulates, there is an ensuing process of aliena- tion, and an eventual breakdown in family interaction. Another pos- sibility is that there is a lack of congruence between perceptions, norms, and behavior, but because of the emphasis in many marriages on avoiding conflict, the disagreement is never brought to the surface. The result is perceived inequity, and as this residual inequity in- creases it finally leads to the process of disenchantment and ultimate alienation. On the other hand, other families may face a large number of conflict issues, but they have learned how to negotiate conflict, with the result that the issues are satisfactorily resolved through perceptual, normative, or behavioral modification, and the ensuing pro- cess of bonding. It is therefore crucial to determine not only the absolute number of issues which create behavior conflict within a fam- ily, but even more important to determine the relative number of issues which are successfully resolved in comparison to those on which a family is not able to reach agreement. It is this ratio of resolved to unresolved issues that determines the stability of a family rela- tionship rather than the absolute number of conflict issues.

In addition, the systems model suggests that the family may choose those interaction sequences which result in the process of alienation or in the process of bonding. If conflict issues continue to result in a stalemate and postponement, then alienation or escala- tion will continue to increase. However, since this is a product of

interaction, and since we can assume that the participants are aware of the increased alienation, we can also assume that the participants are able to initiate steps toward the resolution of the conflict. This demonstrates the morphogenic process of the "built-in system capacity to change the _pattern_ of relationship between the elements, resulting in an altered sequence of occurrence of system events" (Black and Broderick, 1972:9). It is this recognition of the cumulative effect of previous experiences which is demonstrated in the model by the passage from Time 1 to Time 2. The outcome of previous interaction will be determinative in ego's future perception and behavior input, as well as in alter's perception and behavior input (7-8-9 or 7-10-11).

The present model of family interaction enables us to handle both relations of equilibrium or harmony as well as relations of conflict within the family. Previous research has tended to focus on either one of these approaches to the exclusion of the other. The problem is that neither approach can adequately handle the complexity of family interaction. The weakness of the equilibrium approach has been its tendency to view conflict as inherently evil and as ultimately resulting in family dissolution. The result of this framework is that "preparation for marriage does pay a good deal of attention to the _avoidance_ of conflict instead of its management" (Sprey, 1969:705). On the other hand, the weakness of the conflict approach is its tendency to see all family interaction in terms of conflict. This approach overlooks the fact that much family interaction is non-problematical in nature, and does not result in conflict. One of the key assumptions of the conflict approach which is adopted in this thesis is that conflict itself does not explain family disorganization or disruption, but it is

rather the process of conflict negotiation which determines its effects on the family system. An adequate approach to family interaction must provide the ability to handle both relations of equilibrium as well as relations of conflict. The present model provides such an approach.

(10) <u>Summary</u>. Conceptual clarification in the study of family power has taken place on both the structural and the dynamic level. On the structural level, the confusion of concepts in the study of family power has contributed to inconsistent findings. A comparison of studies is difficult because the same concept has been used in different ways, and different terms have been used to refer to the same concept. The integration of various theoretical approaches to the family (Larson, 1972a) has suggested the use of the normative, perceptual, and behavioral dimensions as the organizing approach to the study of family reality in general, and to family power in particular. The two diverse orientations of small group theory and resource theory have been analyzed from the perspective of these three dimensions, and a preliminary integration has taken place. Three levels of congruence between perception, norms, and behavior have been noted. The analysis of family power has usually taken place only with reference to decision-making. A more complete analysis would also consider the division of labor and the patterns of tension and conflict management from the point of view of the normative, perceptual, and behavioral dimensions, and of the various interrelationships between these dimensions. It is this total configuration which represents the family power structure.

This approach, however, can only measure the outcome rather than the process of family interaction. The cybernetic morphogenic model of family interaction, in contrast, takes into account the normative,

perceptual, and behavioral dimensions, but is fundamentally concerned with the process of interaction with reference to the family as a whole as well as with reference to marital interaction. It enables us to differentiate positive, problematic, and negative interaction, and the results of various interaction styles over a process of time. The model further enables us to isolate the dimension (normative, perceptual, or behavioral) within which a particular problem of family interaction exists. Family interaction may either lead to the process of bonding or to the process of alienation, both of which are intimately related to the development of family stability.

IV. METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

The accurate measurement of family power relations has been
assumed by most studies devoted to this issue. Recent studies (Olson,
1969; Safilios-Rothschild, 1969, 1970; Olson and Rabunsky, 1972; Turk
and Bell, 1972) question the basic methodological assumptions under-
lying the measurement of family power. Unfortunately, much of the
interchange has resulted in a rather barren discussion regarding the
relative merits of the self-report method as opposed to the observa-
tional method. Despite findings that neither method correlates highly
with a criterion measure of outcome power (Olson and Rabunsky, 1972),
and that neither method alone is capable of representing the objective
nature of family power (Safilios-Rothschild, 1970; Olson, 1969),
researchers still appear to prefer one method over another. The
approach of this thesis is in keeping with the conclusion of Safilios-
Rothschild (1970:546) that it is "more important to determine which
dimensions of power can be measured by each type of technique and use a
combination of techniques for the assessment of power." Self-report
measures are more appropriate in the structural model of power, but
inadequate for the dynamic model. On the other hand, observational mea-
sures are particularly appropriate in the measurement of the process of
family interaction (dynamic model), but are not nearly as efficient as
self-report methods in obtaining normative, perceptual, and outcome
measures of behavior from large numbers of people because of cost and
convenience factors. Each technique of measurement needs to be care-
fully analyzed in order to determine both its strengths and weaknesses,

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and its relative contribution to the measurement of family power.

1. <u>The structural model</u>. Methodological issues related to the structural model of power are primarily concerned with the weaknesses inherent in the self-report technique. Olson (1969) calls attention to the fact that previous research has relied predominantly on self-report measures without taking the limitations of this method into account, or without making any attempt to correct these limitations. The primary technique utilized to collect data assessing power structure has been the Blood-and-Wolfe type Likert summated rating scales. It has been assumed that power is measured indirectly in terms of the responses to a series of items regarding the process of decision-making within a marital dyad. The person who is able to dominate in the largest number of decisions is regarded as having the greatest power within the family.

(1) <u>Weaknesses of self-report measures</u>. Safilios-Rothschild (1969, 1970) presents an incisive critique of methodological issues involved in the self-report approach to the measurement of family power, as well as making suggestions for possible improvements. Many of the weaknesses reviewed by Safilios-Rothschild have been isolated and/or supported by other researchers.

The first issue is the inclusion of decisions to be utilized in the measurement of family power. Since each investigator makes an arbitrary choice, the family decisions included have varied considerably from study to study. Can the power scores calculated from such variable decisions be regarded as comparable?

The most frequently used sample of decisions is that chosen by Blood and Wolfe (1960:19). They state four criteria which were used in their selection of eight decision areas: (1) they should be relatively

important to the functioning of the family; (2) they should be questions which nearly all couples have to face; (3) they should range from typically masculine to typically feminine decisions; and (4) they should affect the family as a whole. With reference to the second criterion, Heer (1963:135) points out that a method which taps only specified areas of decision-making may not tap an area of conflict for a particular family. If no conflict is involved in any of the eight areas, it is difficult to determine who really exercises power, since it is the actual disagreement which puts power to the test. This is supported by Safilios-Rothschild's (1970:542) argument that the results are not comparable because the decisions may be made at different levels. The wife may make certain decisions because the husband has delegated that power to her, but he still retains veto power. With reference to the third criterion, Safilios-Rothschild (1970:542) argues that the results from studies on same or similar populations will probably be very different, "depending on the extent to which each investigator chose husband-dominated, equalitarian, or wife-dominated decisions." Centers et al. (1971:265) take the position that the eight decision areas chosen by Blood and Wolfe include insufficient emphasis on decisions traditionally within the female's domain of power, and an overrepresentation of areas which are normatively within the male domain of competence. This is supported by their finding of similar power scores to those of Blood and Wolfe when the eight decision items are used, but a 10% loss in husband's mean power when six new decision items are included in the determination of the power score.

A key problem which is not clearly isolated in these methodological approaches is the confusion between the perceptual, normative,

and behavioral dimensions of power. Rodman (1967, 1972) has conceptually indicated that general cultural norms may act as a contingent variable, affecting the suggested relation between resources and decision-making power. A number of researchers assume that self-report studies may be tapping normative dimensions rather than an operating power structure (Olson, 1969; Olson and Rabunsky, 1972; Safilios-Rothschild, 1970; Turk and Bell, 1972). Since no methodological distinction is made between these dimensions of power, it is assumed that they are all measuring the same dimension of power, and hence are equivalent. It is not surprising that Turk and Bell (1972) find little correlation between the various measures of power, given the confusion regarding which dimension of power a particular measure is expected to tap. It is necessary for the methodological approach to take account of the conceptual distinctions between the various dimensions of power. The determination of which decisions are traditionally male and which are traditionally female, rather than being decided intuitively as in Blood and Wolfe (1960), needs to be decided methodologically and operationally in the questionnaire itself. The questionnaire needs to differentiate between who "usually makes the final decision" with respect to the various areas (perception), and who "ought to" make the final decision with respect to the same area (norms). On the behavioral level, an outcome measure of behavioral power could be secured from the "win scores" of an actual interaction sequence of a marital pair or family. In addition to the inclusion of the various decisions which have already been utilized by major studies, a pretest should be given, asking respondents to list all decisions regarding which they have disagreed within a recent specified time period. This approach may isolate further key

decision areas which need to be taken into account. In addition, it enables us to take account of the conceptual distinctions between the perceptual, normative and behavioral dimensions of power.

The second methodological issue referred to by Safilios-Rothschild is the almost exclusive reliance of most studies on wives as the respondents, despite growing evidence of discrepancies between husbands' and wives' responses with respect to decision-making. Blood and Wolfe (1960:6) defend this practise on the basis of convenience since wives can more frequently be found at home and are probably able to give more complete and useful data. Furthermore, they feel that previous studies have shown a close correlation between what husbands and wives say about their marriage. A number of studies (Heer, 1962; Wilkening and Morrison, 1963; Scanzoni, 1965; Burchinal and Bauder, 1965; Olson, 1969; Safiolios-Rothschild, 1969; Granbois and Willett, 1970; Centers et al., 1971; Olson and Rabunsky, 1972; Turk and Bell, 1972; Larson, 1974; and others) question this correlation. These studies conclude that few differences exist when aggregated responses for husbands and wives are compared, but that important discrepancies exist when individual respondent's answers are compared with those of the spouse. Granbois and Willet (1970) found that the percentage of discrepant responses ranged from 35.6 to 59.5. Wilkening and Morrison (1969) found the percentage of discrepant responses ranged from 23 to 64. Safilios-Rothschild (1969) found that 55.1 to 76.4% of the responses were discrepant. Turk and Bell (1972) found identical responses from husbands and wives in only 21% of the cases.

Various conclusions can be drawn from such discrepancies. Most researchers simply ignore them. Others have concluded that they were

the result of faculty methodology (Wilkening and Morrison, 1963;

Scanzoni, 1965). Granbois and Willet (1970) argue that the discrepan-

cies are the result of perceptual differences rather than systematic

bias, and that these perceptual differences could be overcome by devel-

oping more concrete questions, rather than by trying to overcome system-

atic bias. Heer (1962:67) suggests that the husband's assessment of in-

fluence in decision-making is more accurate than the wife's. He assumes

that wives may feel guilty when they are more dominant because of norma-

tive expectations, while husbands would not experience such guilt.

Heer's assumption, whether right or wrong, underlines the necessity for

spelling out the relative contributions of the normative, perceptual,

and behavioral dimensions. This is supported by Safilios-Rothschild

(1970:542), who argues that the discrepancies between perceptions could

give a useful insight into family dynamics, and could be explainable by

means of the prevailing authority and influence patterns. Similarly, it

is suggested that "there is no necessary reason for assuming that dif-

ferential perception is not an aspect of family reality...to ignore

differential perception of family structure and process seems to create

a sterile and oversimplified view of family phenomena" (Larson, 1974:

124).

In discussing the lack of agreement between various measures of

family power, Olson and Rabunsky (1972:231) comment:

> The exceptions to this statement are that authority was related to
> both process power and retrospective power. This finding indicates
> that studies that obtain power scores by having couples discuss and
> resolve disagreements (process power) or by having them retrospec-
> tively recall who exercises power (retrospective power) are really
> tapping who is perceived as the authority on that issue. And the
> person perceived as the authority is greatly influenced by cultural
> role expectations regarding what the relationship should be like
> rather than what the relationship is like, i.e., actual role

performance.

The above comment once again supports the major contention of this thesis that the perceptual, normative, and behavioral dimensions add a great deal of clarity not only to the conception of family power, but also to our understanding of the discrepancies in the measurement of family power. The measurement of congruence between these various dimensions may further clarify our understanding of the dynamics of family reality.

The description of family power as based on the perception of the wife alone probably results in the distortion of family reality. Only two studies (Heer, 1962; Oppong, 1970) base their conclusion on data supplied by the husband rather than by the wife. Several studies have been based on children's reports of their perceptions of family reality (Hoffman, 1960; Hess and Torney, 1962; Straus, 1962). Hess and Torney (1962) show that the sex and age of the child affects perception, with girls and young children perceiving the family power structure differently than boys and older children. Turk and Bell (1972) found that in all their observational measures, children exercised some power, but this never showed in any of the self-report measures. If we are interested in measuring family power, it will be necessary to consider not only the perspective of the wife, but that of the husband and of the children as well. Furthermore, incongruent perception is not necessarily an indication of inadequate instruments, but may also be an accurate reflection of family reality.

Thirdly, Safilios-Rothschild (1970:543) asserts that the calculation and use of an overall decision-making score is methodologically questionable. This practise gives all decisions an equal weight, even

though they are not all equally important. For example, whether the
wife works may have a high salience for one husband, but what doctor to
have when someone is sick may have very little significance. Some
decisions are regarded as very important by one or both spouses for a
variety of sociopsychological or idiosyncratic reasons, or a particular
decision may be more important in one family than another because of
peculiar socio-economic or dynamic reasons. Safilios-Rothschild sug-
gests differentiation on the basis of importance and frequency. Follow-
ing her suggestion, important frequent decisions could be given a
weight of 4; important infrequent decisions a weight of 3; frequent
unimportant decisions a weight of 2; and, infrequent unimportant deci-
sions a weight of 1. The calculation of such a weighted score could
add an important degree of precision in family power scores. Cromwell,
et al., (1973) make the further suggestion that specific items on a
given scale be arrayed on several different continua: masculine to
feminine; rare to frequent; internal to external; instrumental to
expressive (and we could add important to unimportant). The cross-
tabulation of various scales may make a further improvement in the cal-
culation of power scores.

Another weakness of the overall decision-making score is that
its internal consistency and reliability had not been assessed (Olson
and Ryder, 1970; Safilios-Rothschild, 1970; Straus, 1969). Bahr (1973)
reports the computation of the coefficient of reproducibility and alpha,
two measures of internal consistency, for Blood and Wolfe's eight-item
scale of family decision-making. He concludes that these eight deci-
sions appear to measure the one dominant factor of decision-making
effectively. The calculation of such measures should become routine

procedure in studies of family power.

A further criticism of the decision-making score is that the decisions utilized have not been factor analyzed to determine if one or two factors are receiving greater emphasis (Safilios-Rothschild, 1969; Cromwell, et al., 1973). A preliminary factor analysis of data regarding decision-making from five different samples in three cultures indicates possible multidimensionality of from two to five factors for eight to fifteen items. "These data indicate that the use of a mean summation score to represent these indices is methodologically unsound because it is impossible to tell which factor or dimension is contributing to that score" (Cromwell, et al., 1973:192).

A fourth methodological issue to be considered is that "because the overall decision-making score is an arithmetic average it is sensitive to extreme arithmetic deviations and to the unbalanced emphasis of the different factors into which the included decisions belong" (Safilios-Rothschild, 1970:543). Because of this arithmetic property of the overall score, the conclusion that most families are egalitarian as based on the overall score is very different than the conclusions based on an examination of the results of each individual decision.

Safilios-Rothschild (1969:298) makes the following observation:

> ...in our data the overall decision-making score shows that Detroit wives tend to see decision-making as equally often dominated by husbands and wives. The examination of the individual decisions, however, shows...that the Detroit wives perceive themselves as the deciders in six decisions...their husband as the decider in three decisions...while three decisions are perceived as joint...and in one case..women see decision-making as equally shared by themselves and their husbands. This detailed picture...does not seem to justify the trend indicated by the overall decision-making score.

It is therefore not sufficient to regard the overall decision-making score as an adequate picture of family power relations. In

addition, the results of each individual decision will need to be analyzed and compared.

Olson and Rabunsky (1972:229-230) isolate three further limitations of self-report data in studying family power. The first is the requirement that respondents be able to describe who exercises power in their family. This is rather difficult to accomplish, both because individuals do not usually view their interaction in terms of power, and because the give-and-take of making a decision usually disguises who actually made the final decision. Blood (1958:47) comments: "families characteristically have more difficulty in reporting who makes a family decision because mutual consultation so often precedes the final decision that the relative influence of each partner tends to be masked in the process." Olson and Rabunsky (1972) conclude that individuals can report what decisions were made, but they cannot accurately report who made them.

Sprey (1972:237) suggests that the reason why individuals are not able to conceptualize their interaction in terms of power is because such a conceptualization does not make sense to them. "Individuals are ...quite capable of providing a blow-by-blow account of a given argument, but they tend to do this in terms of strategy rather than power" (Sprey, 1972:237).

The above comments call into serious question the methodological approach which measures power merely on the basis of the perception of who makes the final decision with respect to a particular matter. Most decisions within the family involve input from both partners, which may help to account for the preponderance of the egalitarian response. Rather than treating this as an evidence of a socially desirable

response (Olson and Rabunsky, 1972:230) it may be more accurate to regard egalitarian responses as a valid attempt to present family reality. It may be possible that one spouse provided 75% of the input and the other spouse only 25%, but the final decision is regarded as being made by both husband and wife.

A methodological approach which recognizes this variable input of spouses would be the categorization of decisions in terms of the relative input of each spouse. Such a categorization could take place on several different scales (Table 3). This would recognize the variable input of spouses, and would tend to provide a more accurate picture of family reality concerning who exercises power within a particular family.

The second limitation of self-report studies suggested by Olson and Rabunsky is the requirement that individuals recall past experiences which may have occurred some time previously. Such data would tend to be affected by forgetfulness and/or conscious or unconscious distortion of these experiences. Thus it is noted that retrospective power is not correlated to actual power. Rather than regarding this discrepancy as a result of poor methodology, it should be regarded as a possible contribution to a better understanding of family dynamics. Safilios-Rothschild comments (1972b:24):

> The existence of a discrepant assessment of family power structure on the part of the spouses must not be necessarily taken as a "pathological" symptom of a marital relationship in trouble. It may well represent an appropriate adjustment of spouses with different needs, motivations and ideological commitments in that they are in some cases able to be consistent with their self-concepts without creating continuous, unresolved power conflicts. For example, a spouse who believes that marriage ought to be equalitarian and also that his (her) marriage is one of these equalitarian relationships, may be able to cope with the existing unequal power distribution by means of a perceptual emphasis on those power

TABLE 3: RELATIVE INPUT OF SPOUSES TO FINAL DECISIONS

a. Percent of input on
    five-point scale

b. Percent of input on
    seven-point scale

1.	Husband	100%		1.	Husband	100%
	Wife	0%			Wife	0%
2.	Husband	75%		2.	Husband	80%
	Wife	25%			Wife	20%
3.	Husband	50%		3.	Husband	60%
	Wife	50%			Wife	40%
4.	Husband	25%		4.	Husband	50%
	Wife	75%			Wife	50%
5.	Husband	0%		5.	Husband	40%
	Wife	100%			Wife	60%
				6.	Husband	20%
					Wife	80%
				7.	Husband	0%
					Wife	100%

aspects that tend to present a more equalitarian picture. The other spouse, however, may be able to better tolerate the existing unequal power distribution either because of a lesser commitment to equalitarian ideologies or because he (she) is favored (or at least perceives to be favored) by the existing power inequality. Thus, the apparent perceptual discrepancy far from indicating dissatisfaction or strain may often indicate a solid and viable modus vivendi.

Once again, the isolation of the perceptual, normative, and behavioral dimensions, and the congruency or incongruency between these dimensions is crucial in understanding the dynamics of family power.

A third limitation of self-report studies discussed by Olson and Rabunsky is the various types of reporting and perceptual biases which can occur. One of the major biases in their opinion is the tendency for individuals to give socially desirable responses, as in reporting an egalitarian power structure. As indicated above, this may be the result of the methodological approach which asks individuals who makes a final decision, when most individuals perceive a final decision as the result of a give-and-take or proportional input. Furthermore, socially desirable responses are not peculiar to self-report studies, but also need to be taken into consideration in observational measures.

(2) Suggested improvements. The above review of weaknesses inherent in self-report measures of family power has already suggested the following improvements: (1) A careful review of what decisions are to be included in the measurement of power should take place. Such a review needs to carefully analyze the proportion of husband-dominated, egalitarian, and wife-dominated decisions. In addition, clear distinctions need to be made between the perceptual, normative, and behavioral dimensions of power. Asking respondents in a pretest to list all decisions regarding which they have disagreed within a recent specified time period may isolate further key perceptual, normative, or behavioral

decision areas. (2) Further studies on family power can no longer rely on the perception of one respondent (usually the wife). The responses of husbands and children need to be taken into account, and discrepant responses need to be explained as an aspect of family reality, rather than as a methodological artifact. The systematic existence of various levels of congruity or incongruity may reveal a great deal about the dynamics of family reality. (3) The calculation and use of an overall decision-making score needs to be supplemented by a weighted score which is determined on the basis of several suggested criteria (Cromwell, et al., 1973). The internal consistency and reliability of the instrument needs to be assessed, and the decisions utilized need to be factor-analyzed to determine their unidimensionality. (4) In addition to the overall decision-making score, the results of each individual decision need to be examined and compared. (5) Because most family decisions represent a differential input of family members rather than a unilateral "final decision," decisions should be categorized in terms of the relative input of spouses. If other family members are added, their relative input to a decision would also need to be assessed. (6) Every attempt will need to be made to limit reporting and perceptual biases. Such biases are not peculiar to a particular method, however, and need to be controlled for in any approach to the measurement of family power.

A further improvement in the measurement of family power within the structural model would be the extension of this measurement to other dimensions of power. Safilios-Rothschild (1970:541) points out that "only one aspect of familial power, that of decision-making, has been studied by family sociologists, discussed as if it encompassed all aspects of power, and referred to as family power structure." The

conceptualization of family power has indicated that decision-making is only one dimension of power. The other two major dimensions are those of the division of labor and the patterns of tension and conflict management. Blood and Wolfe (1960) discuss both the division of labor as well as the patterns of tension and conflict management (which are referred to as stresses and strengths), but neither of these are seen as a dimension of the family power structure. The inclusion of these two dimensions therefore represents a new approach which has not been considered in previous research. Considerable attention will need to be given to the theoretical articulation of these two dimensions before further methodological approaches can be suggested. In general, it is suggested that the normative, perceptual, and behavioral dimensions will apply in the study of the division of labor and the patterns of tension and conflict management. The interrelationship of the decision-making area, the division of labor, and the patterns of tension and conflict management should provide a good deal of information regarding the dynamic nature of family power structure.

It needs to be emphasized, finally, that all of these methodological improvements are concerned with the structural model of family power. The approach is only capable of providing outcome measures of family power. As such, it is not capable of presenting a description of the process of family interaction. Nevertheless, the suggested methodological improvements will enable the presentation of a clearer conceptualization of the structure of family power. As such, they represent a valuable contribution to an area which continues to attract further interest and research.

2. The systems model. Olson (1969:545) indicates that family researchers

have until recently relied predominantly on self-report measures. There
has been very little utilization of behavioral methods. Recent studies
(Sprey, 1969, 1971, 1972; Olson and Rabunsky, 1972; Turk and Bell, 1972;
Turk, 1974) have urged the necessity of a more dynamic view of the pro-
cess of family interaction, or the necessity of a systems approach to
family power. Survey methods are incapable of studying the process of
family interaction, and it is therefore necessary to turn to observa-
tional measures. Such measures are, for the most part, still in the
process of being developed and tested. It is possible that in their
enthusiasm for the new methodology researchers have tended to neglect
the limitations or weaknesses of the method. Blood (1958:47) indicated
that researchers were handicapped by a severe lack of know-how regard-
ing the practical problems involved in the observation of the family.
A great many developments have taken place to add to our know-how since
Blood's statement, but the observational method in the study of family
power is still relatively new. It therefore needs to be carefully
investigated, and the conclusions regarded as tentative.

(1) Weaknesses of the observational method. The most careful
review of the weaknesses of the observational approach is provided by
Safilios-Rothschild (1970). She points out that the belief that survey
questions represent only the respondents' perceptions whereas observa-
tion reveals the "real" power structure is based on the assumption that
it is more difficult to lie when behaving than when speaking. The find-
ings of Olson (1969) and Olson and Rabunsky (1972) that measures of
authority are correlated with measures of behavior seem to indicate that
observed public behavior is influenced by the normative structure, that
is, it tends to be socially desirable behavior. Furthermore, since most

observations are conducted in a laboratory rather than in the respondents' "natural" home environment, and in most cases the couples deal with situations which are somewhat removed from their ordinary concerns, serious distortions in decision-making behavior may take place. O'Rourke secured measurements of the decision-making behavior of three-person family groups in both home and laboratory conditions. He concludes that "groups seen only in the laboratory will experience more disagreement among members, will be more active but less efficient at decision-making, and will register less emotionality than might be the case if they were seen in their 'natural' environments" (O'Rourke, 1963: 435).

Another issue in observational studies is the extent to which the observers' perceptions of the process of interaction intervene between them and the "real" patterns of power structure. Kenkel (1961) demonstrates that the sex of the observer has an important influence on the decision-making process and accordingly affects the observed power structure. Thus, wives tended to take a more active and powerful role in the decision-making process when the observer was a woman.

It is further pointed out that in the observational setting it is probably not possible to make an assessment of the entire range or the "typical" influence techniques which are used in actual decision-making situations. Reported influence techniques would be difficult to observe for the following reasons (Safilios-Rothschild, 1970:546):

> (a) because of their intimate nature (e.g. sexual relations or affectional behavior); (b) because of the "optimum" timing required for their application (eg. "when she is in a good mood," or "when things have turned out very well at his work"); (c) because the application of the technique requires the performance of some special tasks (such as, cooking some special food that he likes, or buying her a hat or a blouse or another item that the

husband knows that his wife would very much like to have); or (d) simply a long time and repeated application (e.g. "nagging" or "repeating my arguments till he gets tired of me and goes along").

Despite the above weaknesses, there is no doubt that observational techniques can measure the process of decision-making more readily and more effectively than is the case with self-report measures. The fact that techniques are not totally adequate should not hinder us from using what we have, or from seeking to improve or develop more effective techniques.

(2) Choice of technique. Two issues need to be considered in the choice of a technique to measure family interaction. First, is the choice of an interactional stimulus. Murphy and Mendelsohn (1973) point out that much of the initial work in the observation of family interaction was done in clinical settings in order to understand the nature of schizophrenia. A variety of methods was developed to stimulate family interaction. There was some use of TAT cards and Rorschach cards. The most frequently used stimulus is Strodtbeck's (1951) Revealed Differences Technique (RDT). This technique is used by Goodrich and Boomer (1963) and Ryder and Goodrich (1966) to develop a Color Matching Test (CMT). Olson (1969) and Olson and Ryder (1970) revise Strodtbeck's Revealed Differences Technique in order to develop the Inventory of Marital Conflicts (IMC). The development of SIMFAM (Olson and Straus, 1972) utilizes a structured game to study creativity, communication and problem-solving within the family. Some of these techniques require elaborate and extensive laboratory facilities and equipment.

The second consideration in the choice of technique is the method of measurement. Various scales have been developed in order to permit the scoring and interpretation of family interaction data. One of the

first to be developed, and probably the most widely used scale, is Bales' Interaction Process Analysis (IPA) which consists of twelve categories which differentiate instrumental and positive behavior from negative and expressive behavior. A second major scale is Leary's (1955) Interpersonal Checklist (ICL) which classified interpersonal behavior into eight categories and at five levels. This scale is revised by Terrill and Terrill (1965) in order to study Level I communication. Other communication measures surveyed by Murphy and Mendelsohn (1973) are Riskin's Family Interaction Scale, Haley's Family Interaction Analyzer, and Bienvenu's Marital Communication Inventory.

If the research design includes a longitudinal approach, the use of the CMT (Color Matching Test) at Time 1, and the use of IMC (Inventory of Marital Conflicts) at Time 2 would be recommended. The reason for this recommendation is that the IMC was specifically designed as a longitudinal follow-up measure for the CMT. The criteria used in the development of the IMC are as follows (Olson and Ryder, 1970:443): (1) The data should center around some type of conflict which is similar to the Color Matching Test. (2) Minimal equipment, facilities, cost, and time to administer should be required. (3) Observers should not be required to be present while the couple is interacting. (4) The subjects should not feel tricked or purposely deceived as a result of the procedure. (5) The procedure should be relevant and novel enough so that the couples become seriously involved in the task. If the research design requires the measurement of interaction at only one time, the use of the Inventory of Marital Conflicts would be recommended.

The basic format of the IMC is similar to Strodtbeck's Revealed Differences Technique in that it requires spouses to make a decision

individually, and then to resolve their differences jointly. The IMC overcomes three major limitations of the RDT. The first limitation of the RDT is that couples not only vary on the number of items on which they disagree, but they also disagree on different items. Thus, both the content and the number of items discussed usually varies across couples, which is seldom taken into account in the data analysis. The IMC structures the items so that most spouses either agree or disagree on the same preselected twelve conflict items and six non-conflict items.

Secondly, the RDT has generally not maximized or assessed the relevancy of the material to the couple. The IMC material was chosen from reports of problems most frequently faced by couples married approximately two years in order to maximize relevancy, which was measured by the couples involvement in the discussion as well as by specific questions.

Thirdly, the RDT discussion material contained only items which elicited disagreement between the couple. The IMC contains a systematic arrangement of conflict items (n=12) and non-conflict items (n=6). Family interaction can therefore be observed under both conflict and non-conflict situations.

The IMC coding system is similar to Bales' Interaction Process Analysis, and consists of five information categories, six opinion categories, two suggestion categories, four positive and four negative supportive categories, and eight structural categories. Two types of data can be obtained: the individual and joint response sheets provide data on relevancy of the conflict material to the couple and the dominance pattern, that is, who wins. Secondly, the interaction process itself can be objectively measured by means of the 29 categories.

Olson (1975) has completed the development of an Inventory of Parent-Child Conflict (IPCC), which is designed for parents with at least one child. An Inventory of Pre-Marital Conflict (IPMC) and an Inventory of Parent-Adolescent Conflict (IPAC) are presently being developed, and will be available in 1976. These inventories all use the same basic format as the Inventory of Marital Conflict. The interaction session of all of these inventories can be video or tape recorded, and hence lends itself very well to the systems model as outlined earlier. The IPCC and the IPAC would be particularly relevant in the further development of the systems model of family interaction.

3. <u>Summary of methodological perspectives</u>. The development of a research design is beyond the scope of this thesis. Some basic recommendations for methodological clarification have been made on the structural and systems levels. The development and use of both self-report and observational measures has been proposed to provide a more comprehensive understanding of interpersonal dynamics.

A preliminary proposal for the administration of the various methodological techniques would include several phases. The techniques proposed could be administered either in a laboratory setting or in a home setting.

The first phase would be the pilot study or pre-testing phase. This would provide opportunity for pre-testing both the self-report and the observational approach to measuring family power. In addition to the prepared questionnaire, respondents could be asked to list all decisions regarding which they have disagreed within a recent specified time period which may help to isolate key decision areas which have not been taken into account in the questionnaire. A procedure which would

improve the content validity of the questionnaire items is the use of

the random probe (Schuman, 1966) which indicates if the question is

understood by the respondent in the sense in which it was meant in the

questionnaire. The pilot study would also provide opportunity for

training research assistants in the administration of the self-report

and the observational measures.

The second phase would consist of the administration of the self-

report measures. These need to be developed with the goal of measuring

the perceptual and normative dimensions of power. Turk and Bell (1972)

report on the use of three self-report measures which should be

replicated in order to provide some comparison of data. These measures

also need to be prepared so that they can be administered to children

as well as to husband and wife.

The third phase would include the administration of the observa-

tional measures. The replication of Turk and Bell's (1972) observational

and interactional measures is proposed in order to provide further com-

parison. The administration of the relevant inventories of conflict

would also take place at this time. Immediately following the observa-

tional session there is another self-report measure which assesses the

relevance of the preceding experience, as well as securing the measure

of retrospective power (who made a particular decision?).

In summary, the use of self-report measures in assessing the

perceptual and normative dimensions of power is proposed. The outcome

or static measure of behavior is secured from the interaction session,

and is based on whose suggestion is finally adopted as the result of

the discussion period, that is, on the win scores. The measurement of

the process of interaction takes place with the various observational

measures, including the relevant inventories of conflict. The presence

or absence of correlation between these various dimensions of power are

no commentary on the validity of the measures, but may be a more accurate

assessment of the various family realities. These family realities

consist of norms, perceptions, and behavior, with different dimensions

being primary within different families, or within the same family at

different times or within differing circumstances. An accurate measure-

ment of family power must take account of these differing family real-

ities as a relevant aspect of the family situation.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Concerted study of family power over the past two decades has failed to provide consistent, comparable findings, indicating a basic lack of conceptual and methodological clarity. The structural model of power has lacked clarity because concepts have been used in different ways by different researchers with little understanding of what dimension of family power a particular concept measures. Important methodological weaknesses of the structural approach have been noted by various researchers, but very little progress has been made in correcting these weaknesses. A number of researchers have emphasized the necessity of a more dynamic approach to the measurement of family power, which would apply the insights of modern systems theory, and focus attention on the process of family interaction rather than on its outcome. The two-fold purpose of this thesis has been theoretical clarification of the issues involved in the analysis and measurement of family power.

1. <u>Conceptual clarification</u>. On the structural level, the introduction of the normative, perceptual, and behavioral dimensions, and the analysis of various concepts utilized in major studies of family power in terms of these dimensions, provides conceptual clarification. Congruence, or the lack of congruence, between these dimensions is regarded as a characteristic of family reality to be explained, rather than as a finding to be ignored or to be "explained away" as a result of methodological shortcomings. Furthermore, the structural analysis of family power needs to take account not only of decision-making,

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which is the subject of the majority of family power studies. Attention needs to be given to other dimensions of power, such as the division of labor, and the patterns of tension and conflict management.

A consistent demand for the analysis of family power from the viewpoint of the process of interaction has led to the development of a cybernetic morphogenic model of family interaction. This model assumes that power is not simply an attribute possessed by the powerful person, but is rather determined by the complex conditions of inter-personal relations. This involves an implicit recognition that the interaction process may lead to significant changes in system structure.

Two basic contributions of the systems model are its ability to differentiate positive, problematic, and negative interaction styles, and the ability to isolate the dimension (perceptual, normative, or behavioral) within which a marital or familial problem originates. Major theoretical interpretations of family interaction have adopted either the equilibrium approach (Spiegel, 1968), or the conflict approach (Sprey, 1969, 1971, 1972). Neither approach can adequately represent the complexity of family interaction. Much normal family interaction is non-problematic or habitual and thus represents positive relations or relations of harmony. However, each marriage and family must also periodically cope with new, ambiguous or stressful situations. These are problematic in nature, and could have either a positive or negative outcome, depending on whether families have learned to nego-tiate successfully. Some families have developed negative patterns of negotiation and are characterized by a high degree of conflict. The systems model differentiates these patterns, and isolates the particular dimension in which a problem exists.

2. <u>Methodological clarification</u>. A number of methodological weaknesses of the self-report technique of measuring family power have been noted by previous researchers. These are reviewed, and comprehensive suggestions for improvement are advanced. The lack of congruence between various measurements of power has been traditionally attributed to methodological weaknesses. The conceptualization of power in terms of the normative, perceptual, and behavioral dimensions emphasizes that such lack of congruence may rather be an aspect of family reality.

Observational measures of family power which take account of the process of family interaction are presently being developed. The application of a systems model to family power is a new approach, with the result that methodological suggestions are tentative and subject to review and change.

3. <u>Limitations of the present study</u>. The scope of any study determines the range of what can be included, and what must be excluded by necessity of time and space. Exclusion does not signify a lack of importance, but rather a determination of priorities as based on purposes and goals.

A number of limitations of the present study can be isolated. The emphasis has been placed on theoretical development with the result that there has been no attempt to operationalize the approach or to develop hypotheses outlining expected relationships between variables. Basic directions and suggestions for further research have been established by Blood and Wolfe (1960) in terms of the resources model of power. Further directions have been established by this thesis, but their operationalization still needs to take place. The assumptions, concepts, and propositions of the structural and systems models still remain to be spelled out. In other words, a formal system of theory

construction (Zetterberg, 1965; Blalock, 1969; Burr, 1973) needs to be more systematically applied to the area of family power. This will consist of:

> clarifying concepts; eliminating or consolidating variables, translating existing verbal theories into common languages, searching the literature for propositions, and looking for implicit assumptions connecting the major propositions in important theoretical works (Blalock, 1969:27).

Burr (1973) has provided a limited example of the application of deductive theory construction to the area of family power. This example concentrates on Rodman's (1967) synthesis of resource theory. This approach needs to be broadened to include other theoretical contributions to the understanding of family power.

A number of unresolved theoretical issues require further consideration. For example, the importance of the normative dimension has been recognized, but the variable impact of socio-cultural factors has not been spelled out in detail. Some insights have been established by Rodman (1972) as well as by Burr (1973). Similarly, the perceptual dimension has been utilized, but the broad implications of perceptual theory has not been assessed in detail.

Another theoretical issue which has not been investigated is the effect of socialization on patterns of power relationships within the family, as well as on interaction styles.

Although the general insights of exchange theory have been applied, various specific hypotheses of exchange theory have not been investigated in detail. The insights of balance theory have not been explored with reference to the present models of power.

A limitation of the present model is that, though it is capable of analyzing family interaction, the major emphasis has been placed on

the analysis of dyadic interaction of the marital pair. The systematic analysis of various other family groups, and the application of the systems model to the interaction of such groups has not taken place. The contributions made by coalition theory (Caplow, 1968) and other possible frames of reference have not been systematically investigated.

4. <u>Directions for future research</u>. Future research in the area of family power may take place on either the structural or the systems level. Rather than regarding these levels as being diametrically opposed as some researchers have tended to do (Sprey, 1972; Turk, 1974), every attempt needs to be made to integrate our understanding of family power as provided by the structural and systems approaches.

The most basic step for future research is the development of a research design which will take account of the suggestions for conceptual and methodological clarification provided by this thesis. A number of further developments can also be suggested which will build upon the contributions of the present approach.

On the structural level, a number of suggestions for further development can be made. First, a detailed analysis of previous studies which have utilized concepts contributing to family power should be made, and these concepts should be categorized in terms of the perceptual, normative, or behavioral dimensions. A preliminary observation is that most studies have tapped the perceptual dimension (Olson and Rabunsky, 1972; Turk and Bell, 1972) of power, and that few studies have utilized the other two dimensions of power.

Secondly, the research design should incorporate a replication of major measures of family power which have been utilized in past studies as is done by Turk and Bell (1972). Turk and Bell found that

their results were basically similar to those obtained by the original measures, indicating at least face validity of the measures, but that they were not highly related to each other. The categorization of these measures in terms of the perceptual, normative, and behavioral dimensions may provide a new perspective on the problem of the lack of correlation between the various measures.

Thirdly, the interrelationship of perceptions, norms, and behavior needs to be more thoroughly investigated, both on the individual as well as on the systems level. A preliminary suggestion is the development of a scale for each of these dimensions, which would enable a more accurate description. Thus, for example, norms could be categorized in terms of strength; perceptions could be categorized in terms of accuracy; and, behavior could be categorized in terms of control. The interrelationship of these three scales could then be investigated.

Further research with the systems model of family interaction will need to develop several areas which are presently rather tentative. First, the systems model is highly theoretical in its formulation, and represents an initial attempt to apply the insights of various theoretical orientations to the specific area of family interaction. The application of this model may reveal redundant elements which need to be deleted or, on the other hand, it may reveal further elements involved in interaction which need to be added to the model.

An element within the systems model which requires further elaboration is the process of negotiation. Some basic directions which such elaboration may take have already been provided. Bockus (1975:255) suggests that negotiation is composed of five subsystems--the need assessment process; the goal setting process; the design process; the

implementation process; and the evaluation process. Straus (1974b:443) presents a very interesting model which outlines why negotiation may or may not lead to coercion or physical violence. Neither of these approaches fully delineates the various strategies of negotiation. It is expected that the analysis of actual family interaction will provide a more complete picture and description of these negotiation strategies.

Further development of the systems model will need to take more account of the family as an open system which is in constant inter-action with its environment. Such interaction may take place at various points within the system, which will need to be more clearly spelled out.

The two-fold purpose of this thesis has been to provide conceptual and methodological clarification of the issues involved in the analysis and measurement of family power. This clarification has taken place primarily on the theoretical level, and has taken account of both structural and systems approaches to the study of family power. The ability of this orientation to provide a more complete understanding and explanation of the structure and dynamics of family power awaits its practical application.

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Marriage and Family Living 20:47-52.
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   and the Family 31:518-526.

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   1963   "The measurement and bases of family power: an overview."
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
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   Inc.

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Olson, David H. and Murray A. Straus
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   5:30-42.

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1966 "Family disorganization: toward a conceptual clarification." Journal of Marriage and the Family 28:398-406.

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   costs." Journal of Conflict Resolution 14:69-76.

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
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